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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AVIATION LAW
MARTIN J. FOLEY* AND RONALD E. HULTING**
INTRODUCTION
R EVOLUTIONARY is perhaps the best word to describe the
preceding year's' legal effects on the world-wide aviation com-
munity. Recognizing the critical significance of all aspects of avia-
tion to our nation's transportation, communications, defense and
economic prosperity, United States courts and legislatures have
been actively reevaluating and restructuring the rules affecting not
only the domestic but also the international aviation community.
In a dramatic and, arguably, long overdue legislative act, the
United States Congress passed the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978,' which entirely overhauls the aviation regulatory system.
Congress intends the bill to be a legislative mandate to the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB), both as to the direction and policy of
aviation regulation and as to the limits of such policy. This legis-
* B.A. 1968; J.D. 1974; MBA 1975, University of Southern California; Mem-
ber of the California Bar. Mr. Foley is an associate at the Los Angeles office
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Chairperson of the Law and Technology Section, Chairperson of the Products
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of the Los Angeles County Bar Association.
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I This article reviews cases and legislation promulgated between March 1,
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2 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978)
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lation establishes specific programs for increased competition and
a new policy statement to encourage competition. To accomplish
its goals, the bill liberalizes air carrier entry into new markets and
reduces control of fares. Under its "sunset provisions"3 the CAB's
control of air transportation will be phased out beginning Decem-
ber 31, 1981. The CAB's existence will be completely phased out
by January 1, 1985, unless the CAB convinces Congress that the
CAB is needed.
This is not, however, all that the current Administration is do-
ing. The Carter Administration is pursuing an aggressively pro-
competitive "open skies" policy for civil aviation affecting domestic
and international civil aviation." On the international front, a series
of bilateral agreements have increased the number of services be-
tween the United States and other countries and have allowed
greater scope for reduction in air fares.'
In addition, the CAB has struck at the heart of the International
Air Transport Association (IATA) price agreements with its
"show cause" order, issued in June, 1978. Put in its simplest terms,
the order asks IATA to persuade the CAB that it should not re-
move the antitrust exemption from airlines' taking part in traffic
conferences, which are considered to be against the public interest
because of their competitive structure. As a consequence, dele-
gates to IATA's 34th Annual Meeting were faced with a task of
forging a "new IATA." This "new IATA" represents an attempt
at self-regulation by the world's major airlines which will allow
them to pursue self-interest. It seems evident, however, that IATA's
framework will inevitably become looser as its trade association
activities become increasingly divorced from fare and rate fixing.
The activities of domestic and international aviation regula-
tory institutions are not the only significant events of the preceding
year. In an ever-increasing volume, the courts of the United States
are handling aviation-related litigation and establishing new rules
of conduct and standards of liability for enterprises and individuals
I Airline Deregulation Act at § 1551.
4Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., May 28, 1979, at 11; FLIGHT INT'L, Septem-
ber 2, 1978, at 724.
5 See, e.g., FLIGHT INT'L, November 11, 1978, at 1721; FLIGHT INT'L, Sep-
tember 2, 1978, at 724.
0 FLIGHT INT'L, December 2, 1978, at 1999.
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involved in aviation. This article discusses and analyzes the most
significant United States court decisions during the last year for
the purpose of highlighting these new developments and trends.
I. LAW AFFECTING AVIATION MANUFACTURERS
It is rapidly becoming apparent that the most effective method
for a corporation to insulate itself against liability and to protect
itself against defense costs and expenses is by drafting appropriate
language in the purchase and sale documents accompanying the
component or the aircraft. In Pakistan International Airlines Corp.
v. The Boeing Co.," a Pakistani International Airlines (PIA) air-
craft made a hand landing at Ankara on January 24, 1972. A
Boeing survey team assisted PIA two days later by perform-
ing a visual inspection of the damaged aircraft's landing gear.
The aircraft was later repaired, but, while under tow, the left
main gear trunnion support fitting collapsed causing $500,000
in damage. Because of the exclusionary terms of the repair
contract, PIA was forced to allege that the cause of the damage
was the Boeing survey team's failure to discover the gear dam-
age in the initial visual survey. Boeing, however, pointed out
that when PIA purchased the aircraft in 1961, it had done so
pursuant to a purchase agreement which contained an indem-
nity clause. Relying on this contract language, the district court
granted summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed, holding that the indemnity clause of the aircraft
purchase agreement between PIA and Boeing barred PIA's action
because the damages were sustained during a subsequent negligent
inspection of the aircraft by Boeing employees and because the
inspection constituted an indemnified "special service" to PIA
under the 1961 purchase agreement."
Likewise, in a major decision, Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v.
Curry County Spraying Service, Inc.," the Texas Supreme Court
was faced with the question of whether, in an "as is" sale to a com-
mercial buyer, the seller's disclaimer of liability for physical dam-
age caused to the product itself is effective under the Uniform
7 15 Av. Cas. 17,160 (9th Cir. 1978).
8 Id. at 17,161-62.
9 15 Av. Cas. 17,357 (Tex. 1978).
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Commercial Code (UCC). The court first had to decide whether,
in a commercial sale and absent any personal injury or damage to
other property, strict liability should be extended to cover loss
resulting from damage to the product itself. Noting that there was
no consensus in jurisdiction which had previously addressed the
question," the court analyzed the purposes of strict liability in
contract law and concluded that "injury to the defective product
itself is an economic loss governed by the Uniform Commercial
Code."11 Moreover, the court decided that the "as is" aircraft sale
10 Some courts have concluded that the loss is recoverable under strict lia-
bility. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 503 F.2d 239 (5th
Cir. 1974); Sterner Aero AB v. Page Airmotive, Inc., 499 F.2d 709 (10th Cir.
1974); Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146 (3d Cir.
1974); Charlie Hairston Aircraft, Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 457 F. Supp. 364
(W.D. La. 1978); Arrow Transp. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 289 F. Supp. 170 (D.
Ore. 1968); Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1977); Air Prods. &
Chems., Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193, 206 N.W.2d 414 (1973).
Others adopt the position that the loss is of a contractual nature and therefore
covered by the UCC. See, e.g., Long Mfg., Inc. v. Grady Tractor Co., 140 Ga.
App. 320, 231 S.E.2d 105 (1976); Long v. Jim Letts Oldsmobile, Inc., 135 Ga.
App. 293, 217 S.E.2d 602 (1975); cf. Cooley v. Salopian Indus., Ltd., 383 F.
Supp. 1114 (D.S.C. 1974); Mike Bajalia, Inc. v. Amos Constr. Co., 142 Ga.
App. 225, 235 S.E.2d 664 (1977); Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 544 P.2d 306 (1975); Hawkins Constr. Co. v.
Mathews Co., 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973).
The nature of the loss resulting from damage that a defective product has
caused to itself has received the attention of several commentators. Dean Page
Keeton writes:
A distinction should be made between the type of "dangerous
condition" that causes damage only to the product itself and the
type that is dangerous to other property or persons. A hazardous
product that has harmed something or someone can be labeled as
part of the accident problem; tort law seeks to protect against this
type of harm through allocation of risk. In contrast, a damaging
event that harms only the product should be treated as irrelevant to
policy considerations directing liability placement in tort. Conse-
quently, if a defect causes damage limited solely to the property,
recovery should be available, if at all, on a contract-warranty theory.
Keeton, Torts, 32 Sw. L.J. 1, 5 (1978). Other commentators have discussed this
problem: McNichols, Who Says that Strict Tort Disclaimers Can Never Be
Effective? The Courts Cannot Agree, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 494 (1975); Parker,
The Warranty Disclaimer v. Manufacturers' Products Liability, 10 TULSA L.J. 612
(1975); Ribstein, Guidelines for Deciding Product Economic Loss Cases, 29
MERCER L. REV. 493 (1978); Sales & Perdue, The Law of Strict Liability in
Texas, 14 Hous. L. REV. 1 (1976); Wade, Is Section 402A of the Second Re-
statement of Torts Preempted by the UCC and Therefore Unconstitutional?, 42
TENN. L. REV. 123 (1974); Comment, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 917 (1966); Comment,
13 IDAHo L. REV. 29 (1976); Comment, 60 MINN. L. REV. 1061 (1976); Note,
19 S. TEX. L.J. 337 (1978).
11 15 Av. Cas. 17, 357, 17,360 (Tex. 1978).
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agreement was sufficiently precise and broad to eliminate all the
seller's implied warranties and, therefore, that the seller was ex-
onerated from liability for the damages to the aircraft.
Rules regarding sales are Draconian when contrasted with strict
product liability theories and can surprise the manufacturer that
thought it was protected.' In Van Den Broeke v. Bellanca Air-
craft Corp.,"3 for example, Bellanca's disclaimer of warranties on
the sale of a crop-dusting plane, which was not included in the
contract, did not affect the buyer's remedies under the UCC. Al-
though the warranty registration postcard, which was returned to
Bellanca by the buyer after the sale, was, claimed to limit Bellanca's
obligations with respect to the warranties, the court stated that it
had no effect on the buyer's subsequent action for breaches of
implied warranties under the UCC. The court so held because it
did not deem this "notice" to be a part of the contract nor con-
sider its return by the buyer to constitute a waiver of any remedies
under the UCC."'
A further example is Tuttle v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co."
Therein, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
verdict for the defendant tire manufacturer reasoning that Tuttle,
who was injured when a tire blew out, should have been allowed
to pursue her theory of expressed warranty. The court reasoned that
the tire was expressedly warranted against blowout and that the
warranty's limitation to repair or replacement, which excluded a
personal injury remedy, was prima facie unconscionable under
UCC Section 2-719. The court further ruled that this prima facie
case of unconscionability was not rebutted by plaintiff's failure to
show that the tire was defective because defectiveness is irrelevant
to an action for breach of warranty. Recognizing that the UCC
is somewhat inconsistent in allowing a disclaimer for all warranties
while simultaneously presuming the unconscionability of any war-
ranty that purports to limit personal injury remedies in connection
with consumer goods, the Oklahoma high court concluded this
" See, e.g., Fried, Contractor Warranties in Government Defense Contracts,
NCMA, ABA & FBA 5th Annuat Symposium (April 13, 1978).
13 2 PROD. LIB. REP. (CCH) 5 8,283 (5th Cir. 1978).
14Id. at 17,457-58.
u 2 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 5 8,288 (Okla. 1978).
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was a matter governed by public policy concerning consumer pro-
tection. What looked like, but was not, the giving of relief in the
form of an expressed warranty was unconsionable as a "surprise
limitation" and, therefore, was against public policy."6
It is of significant interest to manufacturers, defense counsel
and plaintiff's attorneys that in the last year Arizona, Colorado,
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Ne-
braska, New Hampshire, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
and Tennessee have adopted comprehensive products liability
statutes which substantially alter or short-circuit developing prod-
ucts liability trends in those states' courts."
II. AIRPORTS, FBO's AND OWNER/OPERATORS
A. Airport Noise Regulation
San Diego Unified Port District v. Gianturco" involved an in-
triguing attempt by a state agency to impose noise controls on a
local airport by means of a flight curfew. The Port District, which
operates San Diego's Lindbergh Field, brought an action against
California's Department of Transportation (CalTrans) and two
of its officers seeking a declaration that the curfew imposed on
the airport by CalTrans as a condition to granting a variance
from noise standards applicable to airports was unconstitutional.
The Air Transport Association of America intervened as plaintiffs.
On plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction and defendants'
motion for summary judgment, the district court's Chief Judge held
that: (1) the Port District and the intervenor commercial airlines
demonstrated that they would suffer irreparable injury if they were
required to comply with CalTrans' conditions to the granting of the
variance; (2) the Port District established a substantial likelihood
of success on the merits of their claim that the curfew imposed was
unconstitutional because it invaded a field preempted by federal
law, and (3) the Port District demonstrated that serious questions
were raised in its action and established that the balance of
hardships tipped sharply in their favor and in favor of the inter-
venor commercial airlines since the longer curfew imposed by
is Id. at 17,481.
1 1 PROD. LIsB. REP. (CCH) 55 3010, 3080.50, 3420 (1979).
1 457 F. Supp. 283 (S.D. Cal. 1978).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CalTrans would disrupt or destroy the balance existing between
the concerns of airport area residents, the needs of the community
as a whole, and the requirements of the airlines. The court, there-
fore, granted the preliminary injunction sought by the Port District
and the intervenor commercial airlines and denied CalTrans'
motion for summary judgment.19
B. Airport Security
It is noteworthy that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
proposes to extend the regulations pertaining to aircraft security
to cover: (1) charter flights conducted by domestic, flag, supple-
mental and foreign air carriers, and, (2) all intrastate operations
conducted by a commercial operator which engages in common
carriage with a specified frequency between two points entirely
within any state. In addition, the FAA's proposal would require
that these flights be provided with appropriate law enforcement
personnel by either airport operators or certificate holders to sup-
port passenger screening operations."0
C. FBO Liability
While contracts are often a good method of exculpating lia-
bility,21 one may have to be both a Solomon and a Teiresias when
seeking a release from an aviation consumer or user of aviation
services. In Gross v. William Sweet,22 the plaintiff enrolled in a
parachute training school operated by the named defendant doing
business as Stormville Parachute Center, and signed a broad "re-
sponsibility release."" Plaintiff also informed his instructor of a
19 Id. at 283-95.
'"See 43 Fed. Reg. 9,160, 13,891 (1978).
21 See text accompanying notes 7-15 supra.
15 Av. Cas. 17,305 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).
2 The "responsibility release" read as follows:
I, the undersigned, hereby, and by these covenants, do waive any
and all claims that I, my heirs, and/or assignees may have against
Nathaniel Sweet, the Stormville Parachute Center, the Jumpmaster
and the Pilot who shall operate the aircraft when used for the pur-
pose of parachute jumping for any personal injuries or property
damage that I may sustain or which may arise out of my learning,
practicing or actually jumping from an aircraft. I also assume full
responsibility for any damage that I may do or cause while par-
ticipating in this sport.
Id. at 17.305-06.
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prior leg injury sustained some years before. After receiving one
hour of on-land training, plaintiff was flown to an altitude of 2800
feet where, following instructions, he jumped from the aircraft. On
landing, plaintiff broke the previously injured leg." The trial court
dismissed plaintiff's complaint because of the release. On appeal
the case was reversed because the appellate court concluded that
the release did not relieve the jump school from its own negligence
or from complying with applicable federal air regulations (specifi-
cally, obtaining a medical certificate of plaintiff's physical condition
and providing adequate pre-jump training). Furthermore, the ap-
pellate court reinstated plaintiff's complaint and dismissed defend-
ant's affirmative defense of release."
D. Owner/Operators and Aircraft Registration
Considering the number of aircraft recordation cases decided by
our nation's courts last year and the substantial similarity of the
issues raised in each, it is worthwhile to review briefly the law per-
taining to registration of interests in aircraft. The Federal Aviation
Act (Act) created a framework for a nationwide system to record
certain interests in aircraft and major aircraft components." To
the extent that state law conflicts with any part of the Act, it is
preempted under the power of Congress to regulate interstate com-
merce. There is no question that Congress has preempted the field
insofar as registration and recording of title instruments affecting
commercial aircraft are concerned." However, the Act provides
that state law shall determine the initial or inherent validity of any
instrument recorded under the Act's provisions." At least six ap-
pellate court cases last year might have been obviated had the
participants taken note of these rules."
24Id. at 17,305.
21 Id. at 17,306.
"See 49 U.S.C. 1401-1403 (1976).
2 See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 1401-1403 (1976); State Sec. Co. v. Aviation Enter-
prises, Inc., 355 F.2d 225, 229 (10th Cir. 1966); Feldman v. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank, 408 F. Supp. 24, 36 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
"See, e.g., Texas Nat'l Bank v. Aufderheide, 235 F. Supp. 599, 603 (E.D.
Ark. 1964).
'9 (i) The Act creates a framework for a nationwide system to record inter-
ests in aircraft and it provides that the initial or inherent validity of any recorded
instrument shall be determined by state law. Therefore, when more than one
state is implicated in a transaction, the law of the state where a security agree-
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III. LIABILITY FOR AVIATION CRASHES
A. Strict Liability
(1) Crashworthiness
For a considerable number of years the aviation plaintiffs' bar
has urged our nation's courts to recognize the concept of crash-
worthinessi" as a viable cause of action against airframe and com-
ment was delivered and where the collateral is located governs. Under state law
the assignment of the security interests by the back of the aircraft seller elimi-
nated the underlying debt and the foreclosure upon the aircraft was wrongful.
Bank of Lexington v. Jack Adams Aircraft Sales, Inc., 15 Av. Cas. 17,123 (5th
Cir. 1978).
(ii) The aircraft registration provisions of the Act do not preempt a state
from enacting legislation calling for the registration of aircraft and the payment
of a registration fee. Moreover, the state's repeal of statutes for the assessment
of personal and business property taxes was not an implied repeal of its aircraft
registration statute. New Jersey Dept. of Transp., Div. of Aeronautics v. Greene,
15 Av. Cas. 17,102 (N.J. Super. 1978).
(iii) The system of recordation of security interests in aircraft under the
Act does not preempt state law that would otherwise govern priorities of lien
and title interests in aircraft. Accordingly, an aircraft buyer in the ordinary
course of business prevailed over the holder of a prior security interest created
by the seller and recorded pursuant to the Act. Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Skyways
Enterprise, Inc., 15 Av. Cas. 17,126 (Ky. 1978).
(iv) The federal system of recordation of security interests in aircraft created
by the Act does not preempt state law that would otherwise govern priorities of
lien and title interests in aircraft. Accordingly, the interest of an aircraft buyer
in the ordinary course of business prevailed over the interest of a recorded floor
plan lien. Sanders v. M. D. Aircraft Sales, Inc., 15 Av. Cas. 17,245 (3d Cir.
1978).
(v) A buyer who purchased an aircraft from a fixed base operator and who
knew that operator's principal business was a fixed base operation, not the sale of
aircraft, was not a buyer in the ordinary course of business. Moreover, even if
the buyer had been a buyer in the ordinary course of business, the Act renders
the properly registered security interest enforceable against the buyer in the ordi-
nary course who subsequently purchased the aircraft. O'Neill v. Barnett Bank,
15 Av. Cas. 17,253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
(vi) The system of recordation of conveyances affecting title to or security
interests in aircraft created by Section 503 of the Act does not preempt the
state rule that a buyer in the ordinary course of business takes chattels free of
a security interest created by the seller. Haynes v. General Elec. Credit Corp.,
15 Av. Cas. 17,321 (4th Cir. 1978). But see CIM Int'l v. United States, 15 Av.
Cas. 17,193 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (an interesting aspect of the necessity of recorda-
tion to perfect a security interest).
3' Crashworthiness is a generic term concerned with the capability of vehicle
occupants to survive impact situations with minimal human damage. The concept
is also referred to by such terms as "post accident survivability," "second col-
lision," "second accident," "post crash" and "enhanced" injuries. See Dreisonstok
v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1069 n.3 (4th Cir. 1974) (definitional
authorities cited thereat).
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ponent manufacturers."' Although their past efforts were largely un-
availing," a significant body of recent scientific engineering thought
proceeded to develop the concept.' Either because of the pressure
from the legal community or because of the advancement of scien-
tific and engineering knowledge, courts in the early 1970's started
,' Although the lifesaving and injury minimizing benefits of crash-
worthy aircraft designed have been recognized for nearly fifty years,
it was not until the past decade that a fundamental change in design
philosophy has evolved. Whereas earlier every attempt was made
to introduce safety factors or features which would prevent an
accident from occurring, it is now recognized that a statistically and
socially significant number of accidents are inevitable and, hence,
the aircraft designer should accordingly plan for them. Crash-
worthiness . . . a new technology . . . has emerged. The scientific
base problems which encompass this technology are manifold and
complex. They span a spectrum which includes the interrelationship
of biomedical and applied mechanics problems.
AIRCRAFT CRASHWORTHINESS vii (K. Saczalzki, G. Singley III, W. Pilkey, & R.
Huston eds. 1975) [hereinafter cited as AIRCRAFr CRASHWORTHINESS].
One of the more significant aviation legal decisions of the past
year is a jury award of $900,000.00 to the survivors of a man
killed in a crash of a Cessna 206 in Nevada in 1971. The 206, while
on an aerial survey flight, flew into a blind canyon and crashed
while attempting to turn around.
The jury agreed that pilot error was the cause of the crash, but it
faulted Cessna for a defectively designed seatbelt which resulted
in the death of a passenger. In effect, the jury declared that the pilot
caused the crash, but that Cessna caused the injuries, and should
be liable for them. To our knowledge, this is only the second prod-
uct liability lawsuit won by a plaintiff based solely on the lack of
crashworthiness of the airplane.
Av. CONSUMER, March 15, 1978, at 4.
m' See, e.g., AIRCRAFT CRASHWORTHINESS, supra note 31; THE ANGLE OF
SHOULDER SLOPE IN NORMAL MALES AS A FACTOR IN SHOULDER DESIGN, AM 65-14
(1965); FAA, DOT, THE BENEFITS OF THE USE OF SHOULDER HARNESS IN GEN-
ERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT, FAA-AM-72-3 (1972); FAA, COCKPIT DESIGN FOR
IMPACT SURVIVAL, AM-66-3 (1966); FAA, DOT, CRASHWORTHINESS, SAE
750539 (1975); FAA, DOT, INDEX TO FAA OFFICE OF AVIATION MEDICINE
REPORTS: 1961 THROUGH 1973, FAA-AM-74-1 (1974); FAA, DOT, EFFECTIVE-
NESS OF RESTRAINT EQUIPMENT IN ENCLOSED AREAS, FAA-AM-72-6 (1972);
FAA, DOT, EXPERIMENTAL IMPACT PROTECTION WITH ADVANCED RESTRAINT
SYSTEMS: PRELIMINARY PRIVATE TESTS WITH Am BAG AND INERTIA REEL/
INVERTED-Y YOKE TORSO HARNESS, AM 69-4 (1969); FAA, DOT, GENERAL
AVIATION STRUCTURES DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR TRAUMA CRASH DECELERA-
TIONS, FAA-AM-71-3 (1971); FAA, DOT, PATHOLOGY OF TRAUMA ATrRIBUTED
TO RESTRAINT SYSTEMS IN CRASH IMPACTS, AM 69-3 (1969); FAA, THE PRE-
DOMINATE CAUSE OF CRASHES AND RECOMMENDED THERAPY, AM 66-8 (1966);
FAA, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESTRAINT INSTALLATION AND GENERAL AVIATION
AIRCRAFT, AM 66-33 (1966); U.S. ARMY Am MOBILITY RESEARCH AND DE-
VELOPMENT LABORATORY, CRASH SURVIVAL DESIGN GUIDE, USAAM RADL TECH-
NICAL REPORT 71-22 (1971).
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to apply crashworthiness concepts to the automobile industry."
On July 20, 1978, the California Fourth District Court of
Appeals decided McGee v. Cessna Aircraft Co.' Helen McGee
was in the left front seat of a 1968 model 177 Cessna Cardinal
that crashed on March 28, 1971, while departing Warner Springs
Airport in San Diego County. The weather was clear when the
aircraft struck hilly terrain to the northeast of the airport. Inter-
estingly, none of the four persons on board received major injuries
from the original crash. Upon impact, however, the front of the
aircraft burst into flames which quickly entered the cockpit under
the control panel. McGee, who was unconscious after the crash,
and who was the last to be removed from the aircraft, received such
severe burns that both legs were amputated. Evidence indicated
that her injuries were almost entirely due to the post-crash fire.'
McGee's theories of Cessna's liability sounded in both negli-
gence and strict liability. Specifically, McGee alleged that the
Cardinal's fuel system was unsafe because there was located on
the passenger side of the engine firewall a gasoline "accumulator"3 '
which was susceptible to and was in fact penetrated by the air-
1See, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (7th Cir. 1968);
Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78
(1976); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433 (1972); Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229,
85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970); Buccery v. General Motors Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d
533, 132 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1976); Self v. General Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d
1, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1974); Thomas v. General Motors Corp., 13 Cal. App.
3d 81, 91 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1970).
182 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 147 Cal. Rptr. 694 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
McGee].
6 82 Cal. App. 3d at 1008, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
37 mhe fuel in the aircraft was contained in the wings which were
affixed to the top of the aircraft fuselage. A fuel line then carried
the fuel through a fuel selector valve....
From the fuel selector valve, the fuel line then proceeds to a
fuel reservoir tank, identified during the trial as the "accumulator"
tank. This tank is located on the passenger side of the firewall
separating the passenger cockpit from the engine compartment. It
rests immediately in front of the feet and legs of both the pilot and
co-pilot controlling the aircraft. The top of the accumulator tank
is part of the floor of the cockpit and is made of thin aluminum
sheet metal. The fuel line proceeds from the accumulator through a
shut-off valve located on the firewall into the carburetion system
of the engine of the aircraft.
82 Cal. App. 3d at 1009, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
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craft's non-retractable nosewheel strut, thus causing a second acci-
dent-the post-crash fire." The trial court determined that crash-
worthiness should be treated as a matter of negligence and not
strict liability because, among other reasons, "strict liability puts
too much of an onus on the manufacturer.""9 Accordingly, the
trial court only instructed the jury on negligence principles.
Reversing the jury's verdict for Cessna, the appellate court held
that "California has not only imposed responsibility on a manu-
facturer for a defective or defectively designed part causing the
injury in a secondary accident matrix but has done so under strict
liability rules."* As to Cessna's arguments that crashworthiness
should not be applied to aviation cases and that the strict liability
approach to aviation crashworthiness is unfair to aircraft manu-
facturers, the court gave short shrift stating "[t]hese are not legal
arguments ...and are best left for the Legislature."' This case
reaffirms and extends the position that "[t]he manufacturer must
evaluate the crashworthiness of his product and take such steps as
may be reasonable and practicable to forestall particular crash in-
juries and mitigate the seriousness of others."" After McGee, there
is no doubt that this injunction will be applied with the California
courts' customary vigor to aviation crashworthiness. The decision
was appealed to the California Supreme Court which, on Septem-
ber 27, 1978, declined to grant a hearing. ' Therefore it stands
presently as the definitive position on aviation crashworthiness in
California.
In applying the crashworthiness concept, the California courts,
hopefully, will look to Texas for some assistance. Turner v. Gen-
38 McGee asserted the fuel system of the aircraft was inherently un-
safe because Cessna knew the nose wheel strut was susceptible to
deformation either in a crash or due to rough handling; the nose-
wheel strut collapsed, telescoped upon impact and ruptured the
accumulator tank, permitting fuel to escape in an area where com-
bustion would and did in fact occur, thus causing the second acci-
dent-a post-crash fire.
82 Cal. App. 3d at 1007, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
38 82 Cal. App. 3d at 1010-11, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 696-97.
4 82 Cal. App. 3d at 1017, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
82 Cal. App. 3d at 1019, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 702-03.
82 Cal. App. 3d at 1013, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 698.
California Official Reports No. 27, at 67 (Oct. 10, 1978).
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eral Motors Corp.," cited by Cessna in McGee as establishing a
negligence standard for crashworthiness cases, was appealed ' and
the verdict for plaintiff reversed in a well-reasoned and analytically
sophisticated opinion. The trial court, following Turner I, applied
crashworthiness principles but ignored Turner I's instructions re-
garding a set of balancing factors for the jury to consider in a
crashworthiness case. The trial court, instead, allowed an instruc-
tion charging the jury on a consumer expectation test and the
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. In reversing, the Turner II
court stated:
We are of the opinion that the following factors should be bal-
anced, as directed by Turner [I], in making the determination of
whether the design is or is not defective: (1) the utility of the
product to the user and to the public as a whole weighed against the
gravity and likelihood of injury from its use; (2) the availability
of a substitute product which would meet the same need and not
be unsafe or unreasonably expensive; (3) the manufacturer's
ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without
seriously impairing its usefulness or significantly increasing its
costs; (4) the user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent
in the product and their avoidability because of general public
knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the
existence of suitable warnings or instructions."
" General Motors Corp. v. Turner, 567 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont), afl'd, 22 Tex Sup. Ct. J. 272 (March 21, 1979) [hereinafter cited as
Turner I1].
IThe first appeal is Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d 497 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) [hereinafter cited as
Turner I].
567 S.W.2d at 816-18 (citations and footnotes omitted).
[T]he terms "reasonable consumer" (and his expectations) and
"prudent manufacturer" (and his awareness of risks) have no place
in an instruction to the jury considering a crashworthiness case.
Each term has already acquired a fairly clear meaning in the ordi-
nary strict liability case, i.e., those involving a product defectively
produced. These terms, when we come to apply a balancing test-
as we must do under Turner [I], Larsen [v. General Motors Corp.,
391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968)], Dreisonstok [v. Volkswagenwerk,
A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974)], and Huff [v. White Motor
Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977)]-are purely subjective in
nature and do not place before the jury the true elements making
up either a cause of action or a defense thereto in a crashworthi-
ness case.
Id.
An overwhelming majority of jurisdictions follow Larsen in determining that
"intended use" encompasses vehicle accidents and that liability for a manufac-
19791
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It is further noteworthy that in 1978 the Massachusetts District
Court, Appellate Division7 and the Missouri Court of Appeals:"
each addressed the crashworthiness concept for the first time and
concluded that the doctrine would be accepted as a basis for lia-
bility in those states.
Clearly, crashworthiness is a concept "whose time has come"
and in view of McGee, it appears likely this basis for liability will
be applied by other jurisdictions to aviation cases. If those other
jurisdictions follow Turner II, it will be imperative for aircraft
manufacturers to be prepared to defend themselves with appro-
priate documentation to meet the burden imposed upon them by
Turner Ii's balancing test."
(2) Design defects
While there have been many interesting and significant cases
decided in the aviation products liability design field in the pre-
ceding year,"0 the most important legal activity in this area has
turer's failure to design therefor or to minimize the risk of harm is actionable.
Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104, 110-11 (7th Cir. 1977) (appendices
A and B).
4 7 Smith v. Ariens Co., 2 PROD. LIAR. REP. (CCH) 5 8,269 (1978).
Cryts v. Ford Motor Co., 2 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 5 8,275 (1978).
4 Likewise this balancing appears to be called for by Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co.,
20 Cal. 3d 413, 473 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Barker] but not with as specific an eye to crashworthiness as was done by the
Turner 11 court. See also Foley & Collins, Document Creation, Retention, and
Protection: The Need for a Corporate Program, PREVENTION AND DEFENSE OF
MANUFACTURERS' PRODUCTS LIABILITY 703 (Practising Law Institute Course Book
No. 121 1978).
50E.g., Hansen v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 2 PROD. LIAR. REP. (CCH) 5 8,231
(7th Cir. 1978) (Wisconsin law required a federal district court in a products
liability case involving an airplane crash caused by a defective engine to instruct
the jury on both strict liability and negligence theories of recovery and the
failure to so instruct the jury necessitated a new trial based upon the airplane
manufacturer's alleged negligence); LeBouef v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
451 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. La. 1978) (The court held that Ford Motor Company's
brief cautionary language in the automobile operator's manual suggesting the
need for specially designed tires for continuous driving over 90 miles per hour
was inadequate to place an owner or operator on notice of the hazards he
could expect to encounter at advanced operating speeds and this constituted a
defect in the product); Barrett v. Atlas Powder Co., 86 Cal. App. 3d 560, 150
Cal. Rptr. 339 (1978) (wherein the court held that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is inapplicable in any action predicated on the theory of strict liability);
Korli v. Ford Motor Co., 84 Cal. App. 3d 895, 149 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1978) (with-
drawn from publication in California Reporter by Order of the Court) (Applying
Barker's tests, the court held that plaintiff's evidence was totally insufficient to sup-
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taken place in the definition of the term "design defect." In its
most general sense, strict products liability means that a manu-
facturer is strictly liable in tort if he places on the market a prod-
uct which, because of a defect in its manufacture or design is un-
safe for its intended or reasonably foreseeable use, and if an injury
is caused by such defect." Plaintiff's burden of proof is then: (a)
demonstrating the defendant's status as a manufacturer, retailer,
or otherwise; (b) proving the defect; (c) showing that the defect
existed when the product left the defendant's possession; (d)
demonstrating the design of the product was the proximate cause
of plaintiff's injuries; (e) showing that the product was used in an
intended or reasonably foreseeable manner; and (f) proving the
nature of plaintiff's injury. 2 The crux of the entire burden of proof,
port a finding that a 1965 Lincoln Continental was defectively designed and that
the design was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Thus, there was no evi-
dence on which to shift the burden of proof to the defendant manufacturer); Wil-
son v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322 (1978) (wherein the Ore-
gon Supreme Court discussed the elements of a plaintiff's prima facie case in a
design defect context); Lamon v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 2 PROD. LAR. REP.
(CCH) 5 8,204 (Wash. 1978) (Although a stewardess was aware of the danger
of an open emergency hatch of a DC-10, awareness of the existence of an obvi-
ously dangerous condition did not, in itself, absolve McDonnell Douglas of lia-
bility for a defectively designed hatch for which it would have otherwise been
responsible).
The Illinois Supreme Court recently decided a case that may affect the lia-
bility of manufacturers and vendors of aircraft. Court v. Grzcinski, 2 PROD.
LIAB. REP. (CCH) 5 8,282 (ill. 1978). Plaintiff, a fireman fighting a fire in the
course of his employment, sustained severe burns when an explosion caused
ignited gasoline to be spewed from the automobile's gas tank onto the plaintiff.
Defendants included the manufacturer and seller of the used car that contained
the gas tank. The court held, first, that the complaint stated a cause of action
in products liability against both the manufacturer and the used car dealer for
defects in, and in installation of, the vehicle's defective gas tank. See also Peterson
v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61 111. 2d 17, 329 N.E.2d 785 (1975); Realmuto
v. Straub Motors, Inc., 65 N.J. 336, 322 A.2d 440 (1974). The divided Illinois
Supreme Court held, second, that a fireman can recover in products liability for
injuries incurred while fighting a fire in the course of his employment and thereby
refused to extend the "fireman's rule" beyond the limited context of land-
owner/occupier liability. The vigorous dissent attacked the majority's discussion
of the "fireman's rule" and stated that no duty should attach because the acci-
dent was unrelated to the automobile's use as a vehicle. For developments in
the "fireman's rule" in another jurisdiction, see Walters v. Sloane, 20 Cal. 3d
199, 571 P.2d 609, 142 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1977); Bartholomew v. Klingler Co.,
53 Cal. App. 3d 975, 126 Cal. Rptr. 191 (1975); and Comment, An Examina-
tion of The California Fireman's Rule, 6 PAc. L.J. 660 (1975).
21 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
"
2 E.g., Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162,
104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Cronin].
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therefore, how one defines the term "defect."
It is helpful initially to distinguish between manufacturing de-
fects on the one hand and design defects on the other."d Manufac-
turing defects pose little analytical difficulty. When dealing with a
manufacturing defect, it is a simple matter of showing that the
product as it comes off the assembly line is different from other
items on the assembly line. In other words, it is an unintended
result of the manufacturing process. When dealing with design
defects, however, analytical difficulties increase substantially."'
Here the product comes out exactly as intended by the manufac-
turer. The materials meet the requirements specified for the prod-
uct, the product is exactly as the company's engineers intended
and the quality control was appropriate. The plaintiff in a design
defect case is alleging not only that a particular product is defec-
tive, but that every single product in that entire product line is
defective because all were improperly designed.
How can a court and lay jury make what many argue to be a
manufacturing decision which in effect substitutes the trier of
fact's judgment for that of the manufacturer?" Three tests have
been generally applied to attempt to make this determination. The
first is a consumer expectations test, which holds that a product
is defective if it is not reasonably fit for its ordinary or reasonably
foreseeable uses. This test sounds in warranty language."6 It is ex-
tremely rudimentary and we submit that it defies rational applica-
tion to any but the most primitive or unsophisticated products,"
" This distinction has been frequently drawn in literature and occasionally
in cases. See, e.g., Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321
A.2d 737 (1974); 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A[4] at 3-320
(1975); Cohen, Product Design and Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section
402A, 61 MASS. L.Q. 103, 104 (1976); Phillips, The Standard for Determining
Defectiveness in Products Liability, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 100, 103-05 (1977);
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825,
836-37 (1973); Note, 55 GEO. L.J. 286, 297 (1966).
54See Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Cepeda]; Barker, supra note 49; Birnbaum, A Re-evaluation
of the Concept of Design Defects in Products, NAT'L L.J., October 2, 1978, at 26.
" See, e.g., Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1530 (1973).
51 Keeton, Products Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J.
30, 36-37 (1973).
5" Foley & Prairie, Products Liability Law in California, Los ANGELES LAWYER,
October 30, 1978, at 37.
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and that it certainly does not apply to aircraft. Furthermore, the
focus of the consumer expectations test is on the consumer and
not on the product. The thrust of the judicial opinions in the
products liability field, however, has been to focus to the extent
possible on the product itself."
The second test is contained in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts in Section 402A: "One who sells any product in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to
his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property."'"
Obviously the particular standard that emerges from the 402A
test is that an item is in a defective condition if it is "unreasonably
dangerous."
In an explanatary comment to this Section, the Restatement
indicates that a product is unreasonably dangerous when it is
dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated
by the ordinary consumer purchasing the product with the ordi-
nary knowledge common to the community as to the product's
characteristics.'" While some courts maintain that this is merely a
restatement of the consumer expectations test, others vigorously
argue that it is not. The leading clash has been between California
in the former camp and New Jersey in the latter."'
The third test may be characterized as a risk/utility analysis.
The approach has been developed by Dean John W. Wade of
Vanderbilt Law School and Dean Page Keeton of University of
Texas School of Law." Dean Wade put it this way:
The time has now come to be forthright in using a tort way of
thinking and tort terminology in cases of strict liability in tort....
The simplest and easiest way, it would seem, is to assume that
the defendant knew of the dangerous condition of the product
"' See, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168,
37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
59RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs S 402A (1965).
60 Id., Comment i. California has rejected the "unreasonably dangerous" termi-
nology of Section 402A of the Restatement. See Cronin, supra note 52.
1 Compare, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d
69 (1960), with Cronin, supra note 52.
"2Keeton, supra note 56, at 37-38; Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The
Meaning of 'Defect' in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 559, 568 (1969); Wade, supra note 53, at 834-35, 837-38, 840; Wade,
Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 15, 17 (1965).
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and ask whether he was then negligent in putting it on the market
or supplying it to someone else.'
In other words, Dean Wade posits as a matter of law that the manu-
facturer knew of the defective condition and then asks whether a
reasonably prudent manufacturer, knowing of this defective con-
dition, nevertheless would have put it on the market. This determi-
nation requires balancing the utility of the product against the per-
ceived risk of the product given the manufacturer's imputed knowl-
edge of the defect. Dean Keeton takes a slightly different approach.
He states:
A product is defective if it is unreasonably dangerous as marketed.
It is unreasonably dangerous if a reasonable person would con-
clude that the magnitude of the scientifically perceivable danger
as it is proved to be at the time of trial outweighed the benefits of
the way the product was so designed and marketed."
The California Supreme Court stepped into this definitional
battle in early 1978 in the famous Barker case. ' In the spring of
1978 the New Jersey Supreme Court, in an erudite opinion, sallied
forth in Cepeda v. Cumberland Engineering Co." to do battle with
the California Supreme Court on the definition of "design defect."
Cepeda involved a young man, Jose Cepeda, who was operating a
plastic pelletizing machine. His job was to hand feed multiple
strands of plastic into the machine. The strands of plastic were then
sucked up by the "nip-point" of two revolving rolls and carried to
a rotating drum containing knives that cut the plastic into pellets.
The obvious danger was that the operator's hands could be sucked
up by the "nip point" of the two revolving rollers and that the
operator's hand then would become pelletized. Therefore, the
manufacturer installed a bolt-on "finger guard" that required a
special tool for removal held only by the foreman of the shop.
The manufacturer did not install an electronic interlock mechan-
ism to prevent operation of the machine when the finger guard was
removed. At the time of the accident, the plant was running on a
three shift basis and the shop foremen were required to remove
the finger guard in order to do maintenance on the machine, to
'Wade, supra note 53, at 834-35.
"Keeton, supra note 56, at 37-38.
'5 Barker, supra note 49.
6" 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978).
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clean out jamups, and to change the color of the plastic being run.
When Cepeda came to work on the day of the accident, the finger
guard was not on the machine. Nevertheless, Cepeda started oper-
ating the machine, and continued to do so for three hours, at
which time the accident occurred, causing Cepeda to lose four
fingers on his left hand.
After discussing various issues concerning contributory negli-
gence, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that it was fore-
seeable that the bolt-on finger guard would be taken off frequently
for various maintenance activities and that knowledge of the po-
tential danger of the machine design, as reflected by the evidence
at the trial, was imputable to the manufacturer." Thus, the question
became whether a reasonably prudent manufacturer with such prior
knowledge would have put such a product into the stream of com-
merce after considering the hazards as well as the utility of the
machine." Clearly this is the Wade-Keeton risk/utility analysis.
The Cepeda court went on to specify the factors that should be
utilized in determining the risk/utility, i.e., the defectiveness of
the machine. Again, borrowing from the Wade-Keeton analysis,
the court set forth the following factors:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility
to the user and to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will
cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet
the same need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character
of the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too
expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care
in the use of the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent
in the product and their avoidability, because of general public
knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or the existence
of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spread-
ing the loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liability
insurance."'
67 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d at 821.
:8 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d at 830.
9' 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d at 826-27.
1979]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
In effect, New Jersey thereby established a balancing test. On one
side of the scale goes a traditional calculus of risk, namely, multi-
plying the magnitude of the expected harm by the likelihood of
that expected harm given the nature of the product. On the other
side of the scale are all of the factors listed, which may be char-
acterized as the utility of the product, including alternative product
designs and, arguably, the adverse consequences of those possible
alternative designs. To implement its decision, the New Jersey
Supreme Court set forth a model jury instruction to determine
what constitutes a design defect:
A [product] is [in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous] if
it is so likely to be harmful to persons [or property] that a reason-
able prudent manufacturer [supplier], who had actual knowledge of
its harmful character would not place it on the market. It is not
necessary to find that this defendant had knowledge of the harmful
character of the [product] in order to determine that it was [in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous]."0
While New Jersey and California each spent some time in
Cepeda and Barker, respectively, politely criticizing the other's
approach, in effect each court has adopted as its primary method
for defining "design defect" the Wade-Keeton risk/utility analysis.
Even though New Jersey additionally adopted the Restatement
402A "unreasonably dangerous"' standard and California, in con-
trast, adopted the consumer expectation test and shifted the burden
of proof to the defendant manufacturer once the plaintiff demon-
strated the design defect had proximately caused his injuries, the
critical issue in a products liability design case will most often be
determined by the risk/liability analysis. Considering the prominent
positions of the New Jersey Supreme Court and the California
Supreme Court in the development of products liability law in the
United States, the significance of their fundamental agreement on
the risk/utility analysis approach cannot be underestimated.
A uniform product liability law has been recently proposed that
criticizes the Wade-Keeton approach and argues that the "utility"
segment of the balancing process is too subjective. 1 The uniform
law proposes what it claims is a more objective method for estab-
S76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d at 827.
7144 Fed. Reg. 2,996, 3,005 (1979).
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lishing the other side of the balancing process." The proposed law
will have an undetermined effect on the development of products
liability law, particularly in view of the careful consideration that
has gone into New Jersey's decision to accept the risk/utility an-
alysis and in view of the recent adoption by many states of new
products liability statutes."
B. Government Agencies as Party Defendants
(1) Negligence theories
The FAA is increasingly the target of personal injury, wrong-
ful death and hull loss suits under the Federal Tort Claims Act."
The key federal actor is generally an air traffic controller who,
while attempting to guide an aircraft through the complex of fed-
eral airways to a safe landing, allegedly is negligent in discharging
these duties. Although the cases are generally straightforward in
that the principles involved sound in basic negligence and, there-
fore, turn heavily on the facts of each individual case, last year's
decisions in this area assist in determining the types and quanta of
proof necessary to establish a case against the government.
Deweese v. United States"2 involved Metro Commuter Airlines
Flight 201 operating between Laramie, Wyoming, and Denver's
Stapleton International Airport. On October 3, 1969, while de-
scending toward Stapleton in "IFR" conditions, the commuter air-
craft's left engine quit and the aircraft subsequently crashed. Lia-
bility was assessed against the government because the air traffic
controller handling the flight was found negligent: (a) in failing
to give adequate course guidance to the aircraft in accordance with
applicable federal air regulations; (b) in failing to provide the
aircraft with the latest information as to ceiling, visibility and
appropriate altimeter setting; (c) in failing to give a proper
missed approach procedure; and (d) in failing to hand off other
traffic and give his undivided attention to the distressed aircraft. '
72 44 Fed. Reg. 2,996, 2,998, 3,004-06 (1979).
72 See text accompanying and authorities cited in note 17 supra.
-428 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1976).
Is 14 Av. Cas. 18,459 (10th Cir. 1978).
71 Id. Of special interest in this case is the Tenth Circuit's discussion of com-
puting damages using, among other things, inflation, discounting and future in-
come taxes. Id. at 18,463-65.
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Szilard v. United States" involved the crash of a Piper PA28-140
while landing on runway 34 right at Van Nuys Airport in Cali-
fornia. Judge Pierson M. Hall ruled first that the Piper, which
was executing touch-and-go landings, encountered wing-tip vor-
tices created by an Air National Guard C-130 departing on the
parallel runway, 34 left. The judge also held that the crash was
a result of the negligence of two air traffic control personnel in
failing to space the activities of the two aircraft and in giving a
wake turbulence warning which cautioned the Piper about possible
turbulence on "liftoff" instead of near 34 right's threshold."
In Martin v. United States," the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
considered the United States' appeal of a district court decision
determining liability against the United States in the amount of
nearly $3,000,000 because of the negligence of air traffic con-
trollers. The case involved the crash of a twin-engine Cessna
about one nautical mile north of a runway at Grider Field in Pine
Bluff, Arkansas. In Martin, the pilots missed one approach and, dur-
ing their maneuvering for a second effort to land, the visibility at
the airport decreased from 1 mile to 3/4 of a mile and the ceiling
deteriorated from 300 feet to zero. The air traffic controllers were
held negligent by the district court and this finding was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, stating that the FAA personnel failed to
give the aircraft the current weather observation containing the
deterioration of conditions as soon as was reasonably possible and
that they had given the aircraft an erroneous altimeter setting
which caused the pilots to believe they were 100 feet higher than
they actually were."°
Receiving from ATC an erroneous altimeter setting, however, is
not necessarily a talisman for victory. In Owens v. United States,"
although the controller gave an altimeter setting of 30.32, which
was 1,000 feet in error, post-accident photographs of the cockpit
showed an altimeter setting of between 29.34 and 29.35. The
11 15 Av. Cas. 17,326 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
78 Id. at 17,329-30. The altimeter had a setting of 30.02 and the weather was
clear, with fifteen miles visibility and wind from 260 degrees at six knots. Appar-
ently the wake turbulence was carried in an easterly direction by the light wind,
directly into the Piper's landing pattern.
79 15 Av. Cas. 17,400 (8th Cir. 1978).
0 Id. at 17,401.
81 15 Av. Cas. 17,174 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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court concluded that the pilot had not used the erroneous altimeter
setting and so rendered judgment for the government."2
Furthermore, it must be remembered that air traffic control per-
sonnel should not be viewed as the guarantors of safety in our
nation's airways. In Associated Aviation Underwriters v. United
States," a Piper Aztec aircraft crashed near Cresson, Texas, killing
all six travelers aboard. While vigorously argued for the plaintiffs,
this case highlights the folly of flying in thunderstorms and expect-
ing ATC to pull you, or your estate, out of the frying pan."
(2) Government immunity
The Georgia Supreme Court has apparently concluded the con-
fusion over Miree v. DeKalb County." This now famous case
concerns the crash, on February 26, 1973, of a Lear Jet shortly
after takeoff from DeKalb-Peachtree Airport due to a power
failure allegedly caused by the ingestion of a large number of
birds swarming over the airport and the adjacent county garbage
dump. The aircraft was destroyed and all aboard killed. Defendant
DeKalb County moved to dismiss on the grounds that it was im-
mune from suit under Georgia law. The district court"' granted
the motion and the case went to a panel of the Fifth Circuit,"7 to
the Fifth Circuit en banc," to the United States Supreme Court,"9
back to the Fifth Circuit," where it was finally certified to the
Georgia Supreme Court in order to answer questions of Georgia
law. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the county was immune
from suit on the theories of negligence and nuisance and that the
county was not liable on the theory that the plaintiffs were third-
82 1d. at 17,176.
8 No. CA-3-76-0435-C (N.D. Tex. 1978) (slip opinion, copy on file with
authors).
" See generally, e.g., Judkins, Weather Causation of Accidents, SMALL AIR-
CRAFT AcCIDENT LITIGATION, PHASE II 11, 24, 30 (1974); FAA, AnRMAN's
INFORMATION MANUAL 1-82 (1972) ('"TE ONLY SAFE RULE FOR THUNDER-
STORM FLYING IS TO STAY OUT OF THEM. ..
'115 Av. Cas. 17,341 (Ga. 1978).8
6 In this case the court was the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Georgia at Atlanta, Judge William C. O'Kelley presiding.
87 526 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1976).
88 538 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1976).
89433 U.S. 25 (1977).
- 565 F.2d 1354 (5th Cir. 1978).
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party beneficiaries of the federal grant agreement between the
county and the FAA."
But the king can yet do wrong. In Bowden v. United States,"' the
government failed to answer an intervenor insurer's complaint for
over fifteen months. The insurer's complaint sought compensation
for funds it had paid an insured for the loss of an aircraft in a mid-
air collision allegedly caused by the negligence of airport control
tower personnel. The court opined that, although the United States
occupies a somewhat privileged position under many of the rules
of civil litigation in the federal courts, this privilege cannot be
extended to absolving the United States from a fifteen month fail-
ure to make "even a colorable effort at complying with Rule 12(a),
which governs the time for the filing of answers."'' Accordingly, the
court denied the United States' motion for leave to file an answer
out of the allowable time and granted the insurer's motion for entry
of a default judgment."
IV. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS: WARSAW
CONVENTION9 CASES
The growing amount of international air travel7 increases the
importance of the Warsaw Convention and its modifying protocols
and agreements. The vast majority of international aviation cases
involve issues specifically concerning those agreements."" These
91 15 Av. Cas. at 17,344-46.
11 15 Av. Cas. 17,202 (D. Kan. 1978).
"Id. at 17,203.
9 4 Id.
9 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air with Additional Protocol, Oct. 12, 1929, No. 876, 49 Stat.
3000 (1934) [commonly referred to and hereinafter cited as the Warsaw Con-
vention].
"The factors influencing this increased activity include the United States'
newly announced "open skies" policy involving bilateral air service agreements,
including one signed late in 1978 between the United States and West Germany.
FLIGHT INT'L, November 11, 1978, at 1721.
9 Although not specifically dealing with the Warsaw Convention, international
air carriers may be affected by the recent California case of Trans World Air-
lines, Inc. v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Airlines, 85 Cal. App. 3d 185, 149 Cal. Rptr.
411 (1978). The trial court awarded TWA full indemnification against Alitalia
and Lufthansa for damages paid by TWA to a shipper whose goods were damaged
while being shipped sequentially aboard the three airlines' aircraft to their desti-
nation. The evidence supported TWA's contention that no damage to the cargo
was noted when it transferred the goods to Alitalia. Regardless of the indemnity
provisions of the IATA Interline Cargo Claims Agreement of 1852, the trial
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cases have addressed issues of liability limitations, jurisdiction and
definitional issues ostensibly in the name of furthering uniformity
in procedures and remedies covering international air travel."
A. Liability Limitations
In one of the most stunning developments in recent years, a
California district court in In Re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia,"
has concluded that wrongful death actions brought on behalf of
the heirs of passengers killed in an international aircraft crash are
not subject to the Warsaw Convention and its liability limitation.'0
court apparently applied the federal common law rule that, where goods have
passed through the hands of successive carriers in apparent good order, delivery
at the destination of damaged goods raises a presumption that the damage
occurred while the goods were under the control of the last carrier. 85 Cal. App.
3d at 189, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 413. The Court of Appeal agreed with appellants in
their contention that the controversy was governed not by the common law prin-
ciple but by the IATA Agreement, including the specified pro rata indemnification
of reasonable expenses and attorneys' fees. The court affirmed the result reached
by the trial court because Alitalia and Lufthansa had stipulated at trial that the
court need not make any determination as to the ratio of the liability of each
airline. 85 Cal. App. 3d at 190-91, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 413-15.
05 Two cases interestingly do not fall within these categories. First, in Cohen
v. Varig Airlines, 15 Av. Cas. 17,112 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978), the defendant air
carrier's employees allegedly refused to remove plaintiff passengers' luggage from
its aircraft because of the expense, with the knowledge that the two days' wait for
return of the baggage would have a significant impact on plaintiffs' trip. The court
affirmed the trial court's finding of "willful misconduct" and allowed damages
to the extent of the actual value of the baggage to plaintiffs but not including
damages for emotional injuries. Id. at 17,115-17.
In a case involving "The Greyhounds Who Left The Driving To Delta" and
purportedly identifying "The Lost Chord In The Warsaw Concerto," Dalton v.
Delta Airlines, Inc., 14 Av. Cas. 18,425 (5th Cir. 1978), the Fifth Circuit con-
strued Article 26 of the Warsaw Convention, which requires shippers to give an
air carrier written notice of damage or delay of its goods within seven days. The
goods were racing greyhounds that suffocated on an international flight. The
court held that such an event constituted "destruction of goods" and that the
shipper consignee of such goods need not give Article 26(3) notice because only
damage or delay-not destruction-is covered by Article 26. The court char-
acterized this as a "serious gap" in the Convention. Id. at 18,426-27.
11 15 Av. Cas. 17,406 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
10 The Warsaw Convention provides that carriers are liable for damages sus-
tained by a ticketed passenger in the course of an international flight or while
embarking or disembarking therefrom, but limited this liability to 125,000 Poin-
caire (1929-value) francs-approximately $8,300. Warsaw Convention, supra
note 95, art. 22.
The Montreal Agreement of 1966 (Agreement C.A.B. No. 18900) raises the
liability limit of certain international air carriers to $75,000 per person, and
provides that air carriers in international travel will be liable up to this limit re-
gardless of any fault or negligence. Kriendler, Demise of the Montreal Protocols,
N.Y.L.J. (Aug. 18, 1978).
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The case involved the April 22, 1974, crash of a Pan American
707 enroute from Hong Kong to Den Passar Airport on Bali,
Indonesia. During its approach in darkness, the aircraft's crew
became lost and "[i]nstead of retracing its path and climbing
higher, the crew kept the craft at an inordinately low altitude for
too long a period. '" '1 As a consequence, the aircraft crashed into
a mountain located 37 miles north of the airport, killing all 96
passengers and the 11 crew members. A bifurcated trial was held
and the jury determined the accident was caused by Pan Am's
negligence but not by the wilful misconduct of the defendant air-
line. The jury rendered one verdict of $300,000 and one verdict
of $651,500 for two decedents, respectively.!"
Following the jury verdict, plaintiffs moved to exclude all evi-
dence concerning the contest of the contract of carriage between
the airline and the passengers as well as evidence of the applicabil-
ity of the Warsaw Convention on the grounds that such evidence
was irrelevant and immaterial to the issues.' The trial court held
as follows:
1) The California wrongful death statute under which plain-
tiffs bring their case provides survivors with an independent cause
of action arising upon the decedents' death and derived in no way
from any cause of action belonging to the decedent.
2) Such cause of action is unaffected by any contract made by
the decedents.
3) The Warsaw Convention, the Hague Protocol, and the Mon-
treal Agreement provide air carriers with a basis contractually to
limit liability. Air carriers may avail themselves of the limitation
only if there is a contractual acceptance of that liability limitation,
either actual or legal, by the party against whom the limitation is
sought to be imposed.
4) Any evidence concerning the actual and legal delivery of a
passenger ticket to the decedents, including physical delivery, time-
liness of delivery, type size, and contents, is therefore irrelevent
and immaterial to any issue before either the jury or the Court."'
The significance of this case and the immediate need for appellate
review cannot be overstated.
101 15 Av. Cas 17,406 (C.D. Cal. 1978).





The much-discussed question of whether the Warsaw Conven-
tion creates a cause of action was presented to the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in Benjamin v. British European Airways." Be-
cause both plaintiff and plaintiff's decedent, who was killed in the
crash of defendant's airliner in England, were Dutch citizens perma-
nently residing in the United States, federal jurisdiction was invoked
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The district court, relying on Second Cir-
cuit precedent of twenty-years' longevity,"* ruled that the suit did
not "arise" under a treaty of the United States because that prece-
dent clearly indicated that the Warsaw Convention does not create
a cause of action, but only establishes conditions for a cause of ac-
tion created by domestic law. A divided Second Circuit panel held
that the long-standing precedent relied upon by the district court
should no longer be followed,' citing both the Warsaw Convention
delegates' concern with creating a uniform law to govern air crashes
and other common law jurisdictions' views that the only source
of carrier liability lies in the Warsaw Convention.' The dissent in
Benjamins took issue with the proposition that the majority opinion
promotes uniformity because, among other reasons, the right of
action might not be exclusive. °
In Finkelstein v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., ° a New York
state court held that the Warsaw Convention provides the exclusive
remedy to recover damages arising out of international air trans-
portation, stating that a contrary holding would contravene the
essential purpose of the Convention to regulate uniformly the
'0 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, - U.S. _, 99 S. Ct. 1016
(1979) (noted in 44 J. AIR L. & COM. 669 (1979)).
1ONoel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957); Komlos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 111
F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 209 F.2d 436 (2d Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 820 (1954). The Ninth Circuit has adopted such
holdings, Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 549 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 934 (1977).
10? 572 F.2d at 919.
I0 Although presented with the broad issue decided in Ben jamins, the Ninth
Circuit noted that Benjamins was the rule in only a minority of jurisdictions and
decided an analogous case on procedural grounds, Dunn v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., No. 771649 (9th Cir., filed Sept. 21, 1978).
109 572 F.2d at 922. See Calkins, The Cause of Action Under the Warsaw
Convention (pts. 1-2), 26 J. AIR L. & COM. 217, 323, 327 (1959).
1 15 Av. Cas. 17,379 (N.Y. Sup. 1978).
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conditions of international air transportation. The court further
stated that it need not follow contrary federal decisions."'
Subject matter jurisdiction under the Convention was presented
to another New York state court in Martin v. Air Jamaica."' The
plaintiff had purchased a round-trip ticket for an international
flight that landed in the United States enroute to its terminal
point in Jamaica. The court held that where one point is listed as
both the place of origin and ultimate destination, that point, and
no intermediate stopping point, is the place of destination for




(1) Operations of embarking""
The lack of "control" by a defendant airline over an area in
the terminal in which a plaintiff passenger was injured has recently
been held in Upton v. Iran National Airlines Corp.,' to determine
the inapplicability of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. Plain-
tiffs in that case were in a public waiting area at Mehrabad Inter-
national Airport, Teheran, Iran, when the roof of the main termi-
nal collapsed. Although plaintiffs had received boarding passes
and baggage checks at the ticket counter prior to the accident,
the court held that the plaintiffs were not "embarking" because
they had not proceeded to the restricted area reserved for departing
passengers. The court applied the criteria from Day v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc."' and rejected liability for the defendant airline for
the entire period between the time the passenger entered the air-
port until he was on board the aircraft."' Similarly, in Air Canada
v. Smith,"' the court held that the appellant airline was not liable
for injuries sustained in the airport's immigration and customs
1I' Id. at 17,380.
111 15 Av. Cas. 17,320 (N.Y. Sup. 1978).
113 Id.
14 Warsaw Convention, supra note 95, art. 17.
"' 15 Av. Cas. 17,101 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
1528 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976).
"' Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 217, 222 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976); Note, 45
FORDHAM L. REV. 369 (1976).
"fS 15 Av. Cas. 17,121 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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area that was under exclusive government control. This included
ownership and responsibility for a baggage cart over which appellee
allegedly tripped.
(2) Accident which caused the damage"'
Courts have defined the meaning of "accident" in a general con-
text" as well as when required by Article 17 as a condition prece-
dent to liability under the Convention. 2' The Third Circuit Court
of Appeals, in DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines,' has
made the most recent addition to the latter group. Plaintiff alleged
that he suffered a rapid pressure change within his head allegedly
caused by the pressurization of the aircraft, which resulted in gar-
bled speech, numbness in his head and persistent loss of equilibrium.
The court approved the trial court's definition of an "accident" as
"an unusual or unexpected happening" and noted that insufficiency
of evidence presented that such an "accident" did in fact occur."
The proximate cause condition for applicability of Article 17
of the Convention was presented to the court in Morris v. The Boe-
ing Co."' Plaintiffs sustained injuries incurred as a result of a "high
altitude decompression." The carrier, El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd.,
acknowledged that the decompression had taken place as a result
of the failure of an exhaust valve but opposed plaintiffs' motion
for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs had not estab-
lished that their injuries were proximately caused by the decom-
pression. The court denied the motion for summary judgment and
required plaintiffs to prove causation in this context.'
(3) Aircraft for hire".
The Austria Supreme Court, in a case recently reported in the
"' Warsaw Convention, supra note 95, art. 17.
IE.g., Ketona Chem. Corp. v. Globe Indem. Co., 404 F.2d 181, 185 (5th
Cir. 1968); Koehring Co. v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 353 F.2d 993, 996 (7th
Cir. 1965).
"'1E.g., MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402, 1404-05 (1st Cir. 1971);
Warshaw v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 400 (E.D. Pa. 1977);
Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), af0'd, 485
F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973).
" 15 Av. Cas. 17,294 (3d Cir. 1978).
123id. at 17,295.
1 15 Av. Cas. 17,241 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
1"5 Id. at 17,242.
'Warsaw Convention, supra note 95, art. 1(1).
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United States, Fischer v. Koller,' ruled on the applicability of the
Warsaw Convention to a non-commercial, international flight.
The casual nature of the arrangement for the flight is evidenced by
the fact that three friends, including the defendant, agreed that
defendant would pilot the aircraft, that one of the passengers in-
vited a friend to go along, that only two of the three passengers
were to pay for the flight, and that compensation was to be com-
puted after the trip. Although the trip was planned to be a direct
flight, enroute weather necessitated a return to the point of de-
parture, after which the paying passengers paid the amount re-
quested by the defendant pilot. After a weather improvement sev-
eral days later, the direct flight took place but was cut short by the
accident. The court held that the Warsaw Convention applied re-
gardless of the fact that no tickets were issued to any passengers
and without a discussion of whether the defendant pilot was a
"carrier" under the Convention."
V. AVIATION INSURANCE
If the cases from the preceding year tell aviation insurance com-
panies anything, it should be this: say what you mean more clearly.
Although a recent Texas Court of Civil Appeals case was reversed,
the first appellate opinion in Bowie v. Ranger Insurance Co.'"
is noteworthy. Decedent Bowie's executrix sued Ranger on an
insurance policy seeking recovery of $7,500 for damages to the
aircraft in which Bowie was killed. Ranger denied coverage
on the ground that at the time of the crash Bowie, the pilot,
did not have a "valid" medical certificate because it had been
fraudulently obtained from the FAA. While it appeared that
Bowie had made misrepresentations to the FAA in obtaining his
Class III medical certificate, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals
held that the insurance policy, which required "[o]nly . . . pilots
holding valid and effective pilot and medical certificates with rat-
ing as required by the Federal Aviation Administration for the
flight involved will operate the aircraft in flight,"' was not void:
the pilot had obtained his medical certificate by misrepresentation
127 15 Av. Cas. 17,186 (Austria 1977).
128 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 95, art. 3(2).
129 15 Av. Cas. 17,182 (Tex. Civ. App.), rev'd, 15 Av. Cas. 17,535 (1978).
In Id.
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to the FAA, but there was no evidence that the misrepresentation
was made by Bowie to Ranger. Furthermore, and of greater signifi-
cance, the court noted that in any event the insurer was not induced
to assume the risk by the insured's misrepresentations. Specifically,
the court stated that Ranger did not examine Bowie for his medi-
cal conditions, asked him no questions concerning his heart con-
dition, and no express language in the policy excluded coverage
in the event the person piloting the aircraft had made a false state-
ment to the FAA in procuring his pilot or medical certificate."'
Likewise, in National Indemnity Co. v. Demanes,"' the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals addressed a medical certificate clause
almost identical to the one in the Bowie case and reversed the trial
court's judgment for the plaintiff insurance company which had
concluded that the insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify
the administratrix of the decedent. The court held that the policy
clause purporting to exclude coverage for the pilot whose medical
certificate had lapsed was vague and ineffective. Noting that the
clause appeared to designate the pilots who could operate the air-
craft more particularly than to establish the qualifications thereof,
the court reasoned that the insurer could have stated the exclu-
sion clearly and it did not do so. Supporting its position the court
stated "[a]s one commentator has put it: 'Courts have often rea-
soned that if the insurance company intends to exclude coverage
when the pilot does not have a current medical certificate, why
not at least use those words?' "" The court also held that the
policy clause attempting to exclude coverage for injury or death
to the named insured had low visibility as set out on the policy
and was done in small print which rendered it ineffective in light
of the fact that the co-owner was clearly covered in the policy
as a passenger.
Another fascinating case from the state of California is Insur-
ance Co. of North America v. Sam Harris Construction Co. 3 Sam
Harris Construction Company owned a pressurized Piper Navajo
which it sold on April 14, 1972. On April 19, 1972, it can-
f31 Id. at 17,184.
86 Cal. App. 3d 155, 150 Cal. Rptr. 117 (1978).
l 86 Cal. App. 3d at 159, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 118-19; see also Davis, Aviation
Insurance Exclusions, 37 J. AiR L. & COM. 337, 338 (1971).
4 22 Cal. 3d 409, 583 P.2d 1335, 149 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1978).
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celled its insurance coverage which, among other things, pro-
tected against liability for injury or destruction of property "aris-
ing out of the... maintenance.. . of the aircraft," but only applied
to "occurrences or accidents which happened during the policy
period."S
The trial court entered judgment in favor of the insurer, rul-
ing that, because the seller was not insured at the time of the
crash, there were no obligations under the policy." The California
Supreme Court reversed, with directions to enter judgment for the
seller, declaring that the insurer had a duty to defend in the
negligence action. Noting that the wording in the policy suggested
that "accidents" were distinguishable from "occurrences" and that
in the absence by reference to the insured sellers' reasonable ex-
pectation of coverage, the court held that the sellers' own negli-
gence maintenance during the policy period was an "occurence"
that the seller could reasonably have expected to be covered, even
though the accident did not happen until after the policy period
had expired. " '
As an interesting note for internal corporate purposes, several
House and Senate bills were introduced to Congress to provide a
deduction for amounts placed in a reserve for product liability
losses and expenses and for amounts paid to captive insurers.1" A
Department of Commerce Task Force recommended that tax de-
ductions be allowed for reserves for product liability claims. The
Administration, however, did not support this position. Instead, it
favored a proposal which would allow business to extend the carry-
back period from three to ten years for net operating losses at-
tributable to product liability losses."" The Senate Finance Sub-
committee on Taxation and Debt Management held hearings on
these issues as did the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on
Miscellaneous Revenue Measures but no further action was taken
until a Senate floor amendment was added to the Revenue Act of
1978 allowing that portion of a net operating loss attributable to
' 22 Cal. 3d at 411, 583 P.2d at 1336, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 292-93.
'3 Id.
137 22 Cal. 3d at 412-13, 583 P.2d at 1336-37, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 293-94.
13' E.g., H.R. 2673, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), and S. 542, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1978); see Newsletter from Price Waterhouse & Co., undated (copy
on file with authors).
1 H.R. 1677, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
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a product liability loss to be carried-back (at the election of the
taxpayer) an additional seven years (current law allows three).
Thus, a product liability loss is now eligible for a ten year carry-
back plus the seven year carry-forward of current law.' Addition-
ally, forthcoming Treasury Regulations will provide that reasonable
amounts may be accumulated to pay future losses without a penalty
tax on unreasonable accumulated earnings. The provision is effec-
tive for losses incurred in taxable years beginning after Septem-
ber 30, 1979.''
VI. EVIDENTIARY AND PROCEDURAL MATTERS
A. Forum Non Conveniens
Arising out of the Tenerife disaster, the case of Bouvy-Loggers
v. Pan American World Airways, Inc." involves an innovative
legal stratagem.'" Bouvy-Loggers was commenced in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York by a
Dutch citizen seeking a determination of liability and damages
for the wrongful death of plaintiff's Dutch decedent who was killed
in the Pan Am-KLM 747 collision on Santa Cruz de Tenerife,
Canary Islands, on March 27, 1977.
On January 18, 1978, defendants proposed and plaintiff ac-
cepted a stipulation in which Pan Am and KLM agreed not to
contest liability for compensatory damages and plaintiff agreed to
waive any claim for punitive damages.'" This, of course, removed
any issue as to liability and left only the damages issue for trial.
Furthermore, under New York choice of law rules, the court would
apply the law of the decedent's domicile, The Netherlands, to the
wrongful death action.' Given this scenario, defendants moved
for an order of dismissal on the grounds of forum non conveniens.
After noting that a plaintiff's choice of forum should normally
'14Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 371, 92 Stat. 2859 (1978).
141 Id.
11 15 Av. Cas. 17,153 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Bouvy-Loggers].
14 While the strategy is here employed by the defense, it is reported that the
device was first suggested by an aviation plaintiff's attorney after the Paris air
disaster litigation.
a
44Bouvy-Loggers, supra note 142, at 17,154.
'1 Id. at 17,156 n.3.
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not be disturbed," the court set forth: (a) the principle that "[an
action may be properly dismissed.., when the convenience of the
parties and the ends of justice weigh heavily against the retention
of jurisdiction"'" and; (b) the factors to be considered in apply-
ing the principle.'" While plaintiff addressed each of the enumer-
ated factors, the court concluded that the contacts relied upon by
plaintiff to uphold jurisdiction were relevant only if defendants'
liability was in question; but, in view of the January 18th stipula-
tion regarding liability, "there is no longer any issue regarding lia-
bility in this case."'"0 As a consequence, the court determined that
New York was not the appropriate forum for continuing the case.
Before granting a dismissal for forum non conveniens, however,
the court searched for another forum where the action could be
brought. This was readily provided by the defendants who willingly
agreed to submit to jurisdiction in The Netherlands and to consider
the statute of limitations as having been tolled since the initiation
of the action in New York." With satisfactory solutions to these
problems, the court granted defendants' motion to dismiss in the
following creative manner:
Accordingly, defendants' motion to dismiss the Bouvy-Loggers
complaint on the ground of forum non conveniens is granted sub-
ject to the following conditions: (1) that defendants voluntarily
appear in an action to be commenced by plaintiff in The Nether-
lands; (2) that defendants concede liability for compensatory
damages and plaintiff agrees not to seek punitive damages in any
such action; (3) that all discovery conducted in the instance
action on the issue of compensatory damages by utilized in The
4 Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
147 Fitzgerald v. Texaco, Inc., 521 F.2d 448, 450 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1051 (1976).
1 The factors to be considered include the accessibility of the sources
of proof, the availability of compulsory process over unwilling wit-
nesses, the cost of obtaining willing witnesses, 'and all other prac-
tical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and in-
expensive.' The public interest is also an important consideration.
Of particular relevance in this regard are the administrative burden
on a forum that has minimal contact with the controversy and the
necessity of the application by such forum of foreign law. The inter-
est another forum may have in the controversy should also be taken
into account.
Bouvy-Loggers, supra note 142, at 17,154 (citations omitted).
149 Id.
0 d. at 17,155.
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Netherlands subject to the orders of Dutch courts; and (4) that
the statute of limitations be considered as having been tolled from
the date this action was commenced until the entry of an order dis-
missing the complaint."'
B. Accident Reports and Investigators' Testimony
Keen v. Detroit Diesel Allison"' and Seymour v. United States"'
are concerned with the use of accident reports and investigators'
testimony at trial. Their interest is as much for what they do not
say as for what they do say.
In Keen, the Tenth Circuit was faced with a verdict below for
defendant United States in part based on the testimony of air
safety investigators employed by the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) and FAA.' The issue of the degree to which
NTSB employees or similarly employed government personnel may
or may not testify in light of the prohibitory language of 49
U.S.C. § 1441(e)1' and 49 C.F.R. § 835.3(b)... was not one
'Id.
"' 569 F.2d 547 (10th Cir. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Keen].
iS3 15 Av. Cas. 17,141 (W.D. Tex. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Seymour].
" The Court did not indicate whether the testimony was live or by way of
deposition. If the testimony was live, the court never addressed issues raised by
49 C.F.R. § 835.5(a) (1978), which provides:
Testimony of [National Transportation Safety] Board employees
may be made available for use in actions or suits for damages aris-
ing out of accidents through depositions or written interrogatories.
Board employees are not permitted to appear and testify in court
in such actions.
15 "No part of any report or reports of the National Transportation
Safety Board relating to any accident or the investigation thereof,
shall be admitted as evidence or used in any suit or action for dam-
ages growing out of any matter mentioned in such report or
reports." 49 U.S.C. S 1441(e)(1976).
15649 C.F.R. § 835.3 (1978) reads as follows:
(a) Section 701(e) of the FAA Act and Section 304(c) of the
Safety Act preclude the use or admission into evidence of Board
accident reports in any suit or action for damages arising from
accidents. The purpose of these sections would be defeated if expert
opinion testimony of Board employees, which is reflected in the
ultimate views of the Board expressed in its report concerning the
cause of an accident, were admitted in evidence or used in private
litigation arising out of any accident, and the investigators' opinions
thus become inextricably entwined in the Board's determination.
Furthermore, the use of Board employees as experts to give opinion
testimony would impose a serious administrative burden on the
Board's investigative staff. Litigants should obtain their expert wit-
nesses from other sources.
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previously considered by the Tenth Circuit."' Accordingly, the
Keen court reviewed the split in authority between the Second
Circuit, which broadly construes the bar of section 1441(e),
and the Third and Fifth Circuits, which narrowly construes sec-
tion 1441 (e)." 8 Convinced that the purpose of the statute is to
prohibit use of the report of the Board, thus prohibiting testi-
mony on the ultimate issue, the probable cause of the accident,''
the court held it was not error to permit "the NTSB accident
investigator and the FAA maintenance supervisor to testify rela-
tive to that which they observed at the accident scene and the
manner in which they conducted their investigations""
In Seymour, the district court was asked for a preliminary ruling
on the admissibility of several government reports regarding the
crash, including one from the NTSB. Armed with the authority of
the Fifth Circuit's opinion in American Airlines, Inc. v. United
States,"' which authorized the introduction of one graph plotting
the "indicated" altitude of the flight and one document explaining
a flight recorder's readout, both of which were prepared by gov-
ernment investigators, the district court in Seymour authorized the
admission of the entire NTSB "factual" report."'
Moreover, regarding the reports prepared by the United States
Army in connection with this accident, the court made no men-
(b) Consistent with paragraph (a), Board employees may testify
as to the factual information they obtained during the course of the
accident investigation, including factual evaluations embodied in
their factual accident reports. However, they shall decline to testify
regarding matters beyond the scope of their investigation, or to
give opinion testimony concerning the cause of the accident.
Accordingly, under 49 C.F.R. § 835.3(b), Keen also contended the testimony of
an NTSB employee is limited to mere factual information obtained by the em-
ployee in the course of the investigation and prohibits any testimony "regarding
matters beyon the scope of their investigation" or giving "opinion testimony
concerning the cause of the accident." Keen, supra note 152, at 549.
"'7Keen, supra note 152, at 549.
151 Id. at 549-51.
159 Id. at 551.
160 Id. Given the breadth of the court's holding in this case and the silence
referred to in text accompanying notes 154 and 155 supra, it is interesting to
consider whether the 10th Circuit may in the future allow testimony at trial by
NTSB and FAA employees, notwithstanding 49 C.F.R. § 835.5(a).
1" 418 F.2d 180, 196 (5th Cir. 1969). But see John McShain, Inc. v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 563 F.2d 632, 635-36 (3d Cir. 1977).
' Seymour, supra note 153, at 17,142.
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tion whatsoever of the substantial number of Army regulations
which have an intent similar to Section 1441(e); namely, to
limit use of such reports. Instead, the court analyzed the docu-
ments in relation to Palmer v. Hoffman," which denied the ad-
missibility of an accident report prepared by a defendant rail-
road. The Seymour court reasoned that since plaintiff was
seeking admission of the documents, defendant United States,
whose employees had prepared them, could not be heard to chal-
lenge their trustworthiness. Accordingly, the court deemed ad-
missible the United States Army Collateral Investigation and the
United States Army Aircraft Accident-Technical Report."' Need-
less to say, this case is highly significant in prosecuting or de-
fending (as a manufacturer) a military accident because there is
no hint of the district court's accepting any of the government's
claims to privilege concerning these reports.
C. Attorney's Fees
Assume you represent Pass-Thru Corp. whose sole function is
to wholesale, distribute, or retail a given product manufactured by
Multi Corp. Assume further that (a) one of the products Pass-Thru
transmitted is defective; (b) Pass'-Thru had no independent duty
to inspect the product; (c) your state allows noncontractual im-
plied indemnity, and (d) Pass-Thru and Multi Corp. are named
defendants in a complaint for personal injuries caused by Multi
Corp's product. As counsel for Pass-Thru, what can you do? Obvi-
ously, you can tender Pass-Thru's defense to Multi-Corp. and,
if the tender is not accepted, look to Multi Corp. for Pass-Thru's
attorneys' fees. It is patent that Multi Corp.'s decision to accept
this tender of defense will turn solely on the question of who must
bear the attorneys' fees. If Pass-Thru's attorney's fees is defending
against plaintiff's complaint are subject to indemnification by
attorneys' fees by accepting Pass-Thru's tender. If the attorneys'
fees are not subject to indemnification, however, Multi Corp. most
likely will reject the tender because, it does not lose anything by
so doing, and it gains the prospect of an extra contributor to a
settlement pot.
California and Florida each addressed this problem in 1978.
1-3318 U.S. 109 (1943).
1'4 Seymour, supra note 153, at 17,142.
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Interestingly, each court was faced with one co-defendant that had
successfully defended itself against plaintiff's allegations at trial
and had sought indemnification, including attorneys' fees, from its
manufacturing co-defendant against which liability had been as-
sessed. In Pender v. Skillcraft Industries, Inc.,"' Dade Wholesale
Products, Inc., which sold a defective clamp-on lamp that con-
tributed to a child's electrocution, was exonerated of liability on
all possible theories but was effectively penalized by the lower
court's denial of Dade Wholesale's cross-claim for indemnification.
The appellate court explained the issue and its holding:
Ordinarily one would expect Dade Wholesale to be pleased with
this [exoneration of liability]; however, in reality, Dade Whole-
sale is being penalized. If Dade Wholesale was found to be liable
it would be entitled to indemnification not only for the judgment
against it but also for attorney's fees and court costs.... But since
Dade Wholesale successfully defended itself in the main action,
the lower court judge held that it must bear its own costs of litiga-
tion. We perceive no rational justification for such an illogical
result.
[I]f a retailer would clearly have been entitled to indemnification of
attorney's fees and court costs if it had lost in the main action
and had a judgment rendered against it (for passive negligence,
breach of implied warranty, or strict liability), then it will be
equally entitled to such indemnification in the event that it should
successfully defend itself in the main action.l"
Conversely, in Davis v. Air Technical Industries, Inc.,1' the
California Supreme Court characterized an almost identical set of
facts in which the defendant retailer was likewise exonerated by
the trier of fact in "a products liability action of the garden va-
riety."1" The California Supreme Court held:
[I]n ordinary products liability cases, a manufacturer is not liable
for attorney's fees incurred by an indemnified party solely in de-
fence of alleged wrongdoing on its part. Davis defended exclusively
against allegations of his own negligence, he is is not entitled to
recover attorney's fees.'" '
1"5 2 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 5 8,237 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
166 Id. at 17,253 (citation omitted); see Insurance Co. of N. America v. King,
340 So.2d 1175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
" 22 Cal. 3d 1, 582 P.2d 1010, 148 Cal. Rptr. 419 (1978).
168 22 Cal. 3d at 7, 582 P.2d at 1013-14, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 422-23.
"22 Cal. 3d at 6, 582 P.2d at 1012-13, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 421-22.
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Presumably there may exist some argument that if Davis had
been forced to defend against Air Technical's liability, Davis
might be entitled to that portion of his attorney's fees attribut-
able to that defense. In any event, given the present reading of
Davis by the California Bar, it appears that, absent contractual
obligations to the contrary, tenders of defense down the chain
of products distribution will be unavailing in California, with a
concomitant increase in litigation complexity and costs. Based on
Pender, Florida seems to have overcome this problem innovatively.
D. Comparative Fault
The equitable concept of comparative fault-once merely an
academic curiosity-is now an operative fact of aviation litigation
in the substantial majority of United States jurisdictions.""° Several
interesting developments in the practical applications of compara-
itve fault arose in 1978, particularily in California. In American
Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court," the California Supreme
Court determined that principles of comparative negligence, intro-
duced in Li v. Yellow Cab Co."" to apportion responsibility be-
tween a negligent plaintiff and a negligent defendant, should be
utilized as a basis for apportioning liability among multiple negli-
gent tortfeasors pursuant to a comparative indemnity doctrine. One
month later, the court considered the case of Daly v. General
Motors Corp.'"2 and concluded that comparative fault principles
should be applied to apportion responsibility between a strictly
liable defendant and a negligent plaintiff in a products liability suit.
Two months thereafter, the California high court was confronted
with an issue that synthesized its decisions in American Motorcycle
and Daly; namely, whether Li's comparative fault principles should
be utilized as the basis for apportioning liability between two tort-
feasors, one whose liability rests upon strict products liability doc-
trine and the other whose liability derives, at least in part, from
0 See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 739, 575 P.2d 1162,
1170, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 388 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Daly].
17120 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as American Motorcycle].
17 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975) (California's
seminal comparative fault case in which the California Supreme Court judicially
adopted a pure comparative negligence system) [hereinafter cited as Li].
.,3 Daly, supra note 170.
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negligence theory. Considering the court's rulings in American
Motorcycle and Daly, it should be no surprise that in Safeway
Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart " the court concluded that liability should
be apportioned between two tortfeasors in conformity with the
comparative fault findings rendered by the jury at trial.'
Unlike California, New Jersey took a different view of the
applicability of comparative principles to a strict products liability
case. In Cartel Capital Corp. v. Fireco,' a New Jersey appellate
court construed New Jersey's comparative negligence statutes and
held that comparative fault principles were not applicable to strict
liability actions. It will be interesting to see if the New Jersey
Supreme Court alters this minority point of view.'"
'7 21 Cal. 3d 322, 579 P.2d 441, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1978).
175 California's intermediate level of appellate courts also addressed some
intriguing comparative fault issues in 1978. For those unfamiliar with current
California law the most startling is Baxter v. Scottish Rite Temple Ass'n, 86 Cal.
App. 3d 492, 150 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1978). Therein, a jury rendered a $333,000
verdict for plaintiff and apportioned negligence as follows: plaintiff-25%,
plaintiff's employer-60%, defendant-15%. Applying one of the rules an-
nounced in American Motorcycle, supra note 171, the appellate court held that be-
cause plaintiff's employer was immunized under California's workers' compensation
laws, the defendant who was 15% responsible for the injury to which plaintiff him-
self had contributed would have to pay 75% of the jury verdict. The court rea-
soned that a concurrent tortfeasor whose negligence is a proximate cause of an
indivisible injury remains liable for the total amount of plaintiff's damages, dimin-
ished only in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person
recovering. 86 Cal. App. 3d at 496, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 513-14; see American
Motorcycle, supra note 171, and Li, supra note 172.
Two additional cases of interest are Arbaugh v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co.,
80 Cal. App. 3d 500, 145 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1978), holding that, while the doctrine
of comparative negligence has not altered the rule preventing a third party tort-
feasor from obtaining indemnification from an employer, the third party should
be required to reimburse a negligent employer or his carrier for benefits paid
only to the extent that such benefits have exceeded the proportionate share of
damages attributable to the employer's negligence, and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
International Harvester Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 492, 147 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1978).
holding (i) that defendant Sears was entitled to bring cross-defendant International
Harvester into the action by cross-complaint, even though cross-defendant was
not named by plaintiff, and that hence, the trial court erroneously granted cross-
defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, and (ii) that a settling con-
current tortfeasor may continue to pursue his right of partial indemnity asserted
by a presettlement cross-complaint against a party not named by plaintiff and
(iii) that, therefore, defendant had a right to pursue its cross-complaint and its
appeal after it settled with plaintiffs.
176 2 PROD. LuB. REP. (CCH) 5 8,252 (N.J. App. Div. 1978) [hereinafter
cited as Cartel].
177 The majority of states which have addressed the problem, either by statute
or judicial decree, have extended comparative principles to strict products lia-
bility. Of the more than 30 states which have adopted some form of comparative
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Finally, of significant interest is the Seventh Circuit's latest rul-
negligence, three (Alaska, Florida and California) have done so judicially. Alaska
(Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 46 (Alaska
1976)) and Florida (West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So.2d 80, 89-90 (Fla.
1976)) have like California (Daly, supra note 170) judicially extended com-
parative principles to strict liability actions. At least five states have adopted
comparative fault statutes which are not limited in their language to negligence
actions: Arkansas (ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to 1765 (Supp. 1977)); Maine
(ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 156 (Supp. 1978)); Mississippi (3 MIss. CODE ANN.
§ 11-1-15 (1972)); New York (N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 1411 (McKinney 1976));
and Rhode Island (2A R.I. GEN. LAWS 5 9-20-4 (Supp. 1978)). The New York
statute expressly applied to strict liability actions. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw,
supra. Practice Commentaries, C1411:1. The Mississippi statute has been ju-
dicially construed as extending to suits founded on strict products liability.
Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276, 290 (5th Cir. 1975). On the
other hand, one state, Connecticut, has statutorily prohibited the use of com-
parative fault as a defense in strict liability actions. 1976 Conn. Pub. Act 77-335
(eff. July 1, 1977).
Of the three decisions besides Cartel, supra note 176, that have declined to
apply comparative negligence to strict liability, two have relied on state compara-
tive negligence statutes that are expressly confined to "negligence" actions. Melia
v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795, 802 (8th Cir. 1976) (Nebraska's "slight-gross"
comparative negligence statute); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 F.2d
1353, 1357-58 (10th Cir. 1974) (noting the limiting language in the Oklahoma
statute but holding that driving while intoxicated was product misuse barring re-
covery); see Kinard v. Coats Co., 553 P.2d 835, 837 (Colo. App. 1976). At least
four jurisdictions have applied comparative negligence statutes to strict liability ac-
tions, despite language arguably limiting the statute application to negligence. Sun
Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598, 602-03 (D. Idaho
1976); Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676, 681-83 (D.N.H.
1972); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55, 64 (1967); Busch v.
Busch Constr., Inc., 2 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 5 8,086 (Minn. 1977). Finally,
one court has judicially extended a "pure" form of comparative fault to the
traditional strict liability defense of "product misuse," despite the existence of a
statutory scheme of "modified" comparative negligence. General Motors Corp. v.
Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351-52 (Tex. 1977).
Moreover, the apparent majority of scholarly commentators has urged use
of comparative fault principles in strict liability actions. Fleming, The Supreme
Court of California 1974-1975-Foreword: Comparative Negligence at Last-By
Judicial Choice, CALIF. L. REV. 239, 269-71 (1976); Noel, Defective Products:
Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L.
REV. 93, 117-18 (1972); Wade, A Uniform Comparative Fault Act-What
Should It Provide?, 10 MICH. J.L. REF. 220 (1977); Wade, supra note 53, at 850;
SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 5 12.1 (1974), SCHWARTZ, SPECIAL CAL.
SUPP. RE NGA LI V. YELLOW CAB CO., 5 4 (B) at 8 (1975).
Contra, Levine, Strict Products Liability and Comparative Negligence: The Col-
lision of Fault and No-Fault, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 337, 346 et seq. (1977).
Among other commentaries urging such a role are: Brewster, Comparative
Negligence In Strict Liability Cases, 42 J. AIR L. & CoM. 107, 109-17 (1976);
Epstein, Products Liability: Defenses Based on Plaintiff's Conducts, 1968 UTAH
L. REV. 267, 284; Feinberg, The Applicability of a Comparative Negligence
Defense in a Strict Products Liability Suit Based on Section 402A of the
Restatement of Torts 2d, 42 INS. CouNs. J. 39, 52 (1975); Levine, Buyer's Con-
duct as Affecting the Extent of Manufacturer's Liability in Warranty, 52 MINN.
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ing in Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.,*'" concerning the legal
morass 1'" stemming from the September 9, 1969 mid-air collision
over Fairland, Indiana between an Allegheny Airlines DC-9 and
a private plane flown by a student pilot. First, the court decided
that the United States was not entitled to share with Allegheny
in the $1,000,000 contribution from the private aircraft's owner."'
Second, and of more general interest, the court, which in Kohr I
had proclaimed the existence of a federal common law of com-
parative negligence in aviation matters," ' ruled that the district
court "did not err in the determination that under Indiana state
law Allegheny's contributory negligence [22 percent as fixed by
L. REv. 627, 652-63 (1968); Posner, et al., Comparative Negligence in Cali-
fornia: Some Legislative Solutions-Part II, L.A. DAILY J. REP., August 26, 1977,
at 4, 9-18 (proposed legislation); Comment, 40 ALB. L. REv. 777, 810 (1976);
20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 924, 925 (1969). Contra, Robinson, Square Pegs (Products
Liability) in Round Holes (Comparative Negligence), 52 CAL. ST. B.J. 16 (1977);
Schwartz, Pure Comparative Negligence in Action, 34 AM. TRIAL L.J. 117, 129
(1972).
Furthermore, in August 1977, the National Conference of the Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws ("Conference") approved adoption of the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act ("Act") by a vote of forty states to eight. The Act is
the distillation of approximately five years of discussion, analysis, and contribu-
tion by a special committee and a review committee of the Conference. Pertinent
to this issue the Act provides:
Section 1. [Effect of Contributory Fault.]
(a) In an action based on fault to recover damages for injury or
death to person or harm to property, any contributory fault charge-
able to the claimant diminishes proportionately the amount awarded
as compensatory damages for an injury attributable to the claimant's
contributory fault, but does not bar recovery....
(b) "Fault" includes acts or omissions that are in any measure
negligent or reckless toward the person or property of the actor
or others, or that subject a person to strict tort liability.
While lacking any legislative sanction, the Act points in the direction of a
general national trend. As such, section 1 is revealing in two notable respects: in
its clear definitional expression in subsection (b) that comparative principles
are to be applied to cases of "strict tort liability," and in its substitution of the
broad generic term "fault," in subsection (a), as including both negligence and
strict liability. See U.S. Dep't of Comm., Options Paper on Product Liability and
Accident Compensation Issues, 43 Fed Reg. 14,613 (1978); U.S. Dep't of Comm.,
Draft Uniform Product Liability Law, 44 Fed. Reg. 2,996 (1979) (Model Prod-
ucts Liability Law).
18 586 F.2d 53 (7th Cir. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Kohr II].
179 See Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Kohr 1]; Allegheny Airlines,
Inc. v. United States, 504 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978
(1975).
189 Kohr II, supra note 178, at 56-57.
"8 Kohr 1, supra note 179, at 403.
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the jury] in causation debars recovery from the government for
the loss of its DC-9.'.. The court reasoned: "In view of the
Supreme Court's views,"u we are not free to extend Kohr [I] to
an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The law referred
to the Act is, as Richards'" holds, state law.''..
E. Choice of Law
Choice of law rules continually present their labyrinthine chal-
lenges to the aviation legal specialist. As usual, 1978's decisions
in this thorny and somewhat ethereal area significantly affected the
rights of the parties involved. In several Tenerife cases' that the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred to the South-
ern District Court in New York, 8 ' Judge Robert Ward was called
on to determine the applicability of punitive damages statutes both
to a wrongful death action and to several personal injury suits. In
each case, Judge Ward utilized an interest analysis and looked to
the particular issue (viz., the availability of punitive damages) to
determine which state had the strongest interest in having its law
applied. Under both Massachusetts law (for the wrongful death
case) and under California law (for the personal injury cases),
the court determined that the Supreme Court of these jurisdictions
recognized that the interest in regulation of conduct in tort cases
is primarily local in character and is the concern of the jurisdiction
in which the conduct occurred. Consequently, the court looked to
the law of Spain inasmuch as the Canary Islands are Spanish
possessions and determined that no punitive damages were provided
for wrongful death or personal injuries arising from a crash of
this sort. Accordingly, the court dismissed the punitive damages
claims.
182 Kohr H1, supra note 178, at 58.
in See text accompanying notes 85-91 supra. Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v.
Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 273-74 (1972).
'"Richards v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1962).
u5 Kohr I, supra note 178, at 58; see Bowen v. United States, 570 F.2d 1311,
1317 (9th Cir. 1978).
188 Sibley v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 454 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(wrongful death-Massachusetts law); Jackson v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maats-
chappij N.V. and consolidated cases, 77 Civ. 5867 RJW, 78 Civ. 1121 RJW and
78 Civ. 254 RJW (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (personal injuries-California law) (slip
opinions on file with authors).
" MDL Docket No. 396, opinion fied August 16, 1977.
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Melville v. American Home Assurance Co." is the final dra-
matic episode in a fascinating legal saga concerned with the demise
of Joseph Marvel ("Jay") Scott, a member of a wealthy and re-
spected Wilmington, Delaware, family. The report of the aircraft
crash that killed Jay Scott is detailed in the excellent district court
opinion. ' Plaintiff Melville was the sole beneficiary of a $500,000
accident insurance policy purchased by the insured, Jay Scott.
Following the insured's death in the bizarre crash, a diversity ac-
tion was commenced in the federal court in the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania to recover the insurance proceeds."* The principal
defense asserted by American was that Jay Scott had committed
suicide by intentionally interfering with the pilot's use of the dual
controls in the Piper Cherokee Arrow in which he was the sole
passenger. The policy excluded coverage when death occurred by
reason of suicide.
Jay Scott had been a lifelong citizen of Delaware. He had pur-
chased the Insurance policy from the Delaware offices of Johnson
& Higgins, an insurance broker whose main office is in Phila-
delphia. The broker had placed the order by phone with American
and an oral binder was effected by American's New York office.
American consequently issued the policy and posted it in New
York. It was sent to the broker's Philadelphia office, through which
it eventually reached Scott in Delaware. Scott met his death in
Delaware, the locale where most of the facts relevant to the ques-
tion of accident or suicide occurred.
Because of the nature of the claim and the defense in this case,
the district court was required to utilize Pennsylvania's conflict
rules in choosing among the Pennsylvania, Delaware and New
York presumptions against suicide. Since the differences between
the New York presumption, on the one hand, and those of Penn-
sylvania and Delaware, on the other hand, would have a significant
effect on the outcome of the trial, a conflict in terms of choice of
1s 584 F.2d 1306 (3d Cir. 1978).
189Melville v. American Assur. Co., 443 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1977),
rev'd, 584 F.2d. 1306 (3d Cir. 1978).
190A previous action had been commenced in New York state court, but had
been dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens. In the instant action,
diversity of citizenship existed because Melville was a citizen of Pennsylvania at
the time of suit, and American is a New York corporation with its principal place
of business in New York.
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law was presented. Normally, the beneficiary of an accident in-
surance policy has the burden of pleading and proving an acci-
dent; ' however, New York prescribes a presumption against sui-
cide that imposes on the party contending that violent death was
self-inflicted (American) the burden of pleading and persuasion
as to that contention. ' Pennsylvania has no such strong pre-
sumption against suicide, for Pennsylvania law provides that it
is merely permissible for the fact-finder to infer, based on com-
mon understanding of human nature, that death was not self-
inflicted.'" The district court concluded that New York's interest
outweighed the other two states' interests and applied New York
law. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in the amount of
$500,000. American appealed. The Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, in an analytical tour de force reversed the lower court
opinion because the Circuit Panel concluded Delaware law should
have been utilized."
F. Jurisdiction
Ladd v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines,"' involving defendant air-
line's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction a com-
plaint based upon the Tenerife disaster, may have substantial ad-
verse consequences for future airline defendants if the court's
implications are fully realized. In Ladd, a Tennessee domiciliary
commenced a wrongful death action in Tennessee as administra-
trix of the estate of a Pan Am stewardess killed at Tenerife. KLM
contended it was not subject to service of process in Tennessee be-
"' See, e.g., Adams v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 136 Pa. Super. Ct. 454, 7
A.2d 544 (1939).
19 443 F. Supp. at 1082.
19 No Delaware case addresses itself to the presumption against suicide in
suits involving accidental death insurance policies. Following the command of
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), the district court
applied Pennsylvania's conflicts rule that when a sister state's law is unknown or
unclear it is presumed to be the same as Pennsylvania's. In re Trust of Penning-
ton, 421 Pa. 334, 219 A.2d 353, 356 (1966). For purposes of this appeal, the
Third Circuit viewed Delaware's and Pennsylvania's presumptions against suicide
as identical.
"' An interesting sidelight of this case is the Third Circuit's approval of the
admission of Airworthiness Directives (AD's) relating to the Piper Cherokee
Arrow's stabilator as exceptions to the hearsay rule under Fed. R. Evid. 803(8).
See also text accompanying and authorities cited in note 161 supra.
1 15 Av. Cas. 17,321 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Ladd].
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cause: (a) it is a Dutch corporation with its principal place of
business in The Netherlands; (b) it is not authorized to fly into any
place within Tennessee; (c) it is not authorized to do business in
Tennessee and pays no taxes there; and (d) it has none of the other
traditional jurisdictional contacts with Tennessee.'"
In opposition, plaintiff pointed to the facts that (a) KLM has
out-of-state toll free numbers in six of Tennessee's major urban
centers; (b) as part of its national marketing program, KLM ad-
vertises in magazines that circulate in the state 9 ' and supplies
posters, brochures and other promotional material to Tennessee
travel agents; (c) KLM sales representatives make regular business
trips to contact Tennessee travel agencies and Tennessee groups
likely to have travel plans; and (d) apparently very important to
the Court, KLM tickets are actually sold by a large number of
travel agents in Tennessee."8 The court concluded that KLM
sought, in a continuous and systematic manner to benefit from the
sale of tickets to Tennessee residents and succeeded in this effort.19'
Accordingly, the court denied KLM's motion to quash, ruling it
had sufficient "minimum contacts" with Tennessee so that it would
not "offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice"
to require KLM to defend this action in Tennessee and, porten-
tiously for future airline litigants, the court stated "[t]hat the
sales [had] been consummated by travel agents residing in Ten-
'" KLM had no office or bank account in Tennessee; it did not own, lease,
or have any interest in any real property in that jurisdiction; none of its directors,
officers, or executives resided there; and KLM had no agent or agent for service
of process in Tennessee.
"' The court specifically mentioned The Wall Street Journal and The New
Yorker. Ladd, supra note 195, at 17,323.
199 There are eighty-five travel agents in the state approved by the
International Air Transport Association. All of these agents have
authority to issue tickets on behalf of those airlines from which they
have received airline identification plates. A ticket issued in the
name of any such airline may provide that a portion of the transpor-
tation be furnished by KLM. Moreover, KLM has issued its own
airline identification plates to more than sixty Tennessee travel
agencies. These agencies can not only issue tickets which include
transportation on a KLM aircraft, but also, through use of the
plate on blank Air Traffic Conference ticket stock, can issue tickets
in KLM's name and airline code number. The dollar volume of
those tickets issued in Tennessee in KLM's name alone amounted




nessee, and not through persons on KLM's own payroll is not
significant for these purposes...."'
Jurisdictional issues of interest to the travel agency and airline
segments of our industry were ruled on in Viking Travel, Inc. v.
Air France"1 and Caceres Agency, Inc. v. Lufthansa German Air-
lines.' These cases each hold that no private right of action exists
in favor of travel agents against air carriers for alleged rebating
violations of section 403 (b) of the Federal Aviation Act because,
while the travel agents are within the class the Act is designed to
regulate, they are not within the class the Act is designed to pro-
tect, that is, the users of air transportation.' Additionally, Viking
Travel also holds that the CAB does not have primary jurisdiction
of an antitrust complaint that charges various air carriers and
travel agents with having conspired to utilize an unlawful and dis-
criminatory rebate system in violation of the properly filed tariff.
The court stated that when the question is not the reasonableness
of the tariff, but a violation of such tariffs or the manner in which
they are applied, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is inapplic-
able.'
G. Attorney-client Privilege
A case of signal importance to the aviation-accident bar in terms
of accident or product defect investigations was handed down by
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals en banc in early 1978. In
Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith,' the court held that an
investigative report prepared by a law firm was entitled to the
attorney-client privilege in subsequent antitrust litigation against
the company by a customer who claimed that its employees had
been bribed to purchase inferior copper.' The court analyzed
200 Id.
-1 15 Av. Cas. 17,224 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Viking Travel].
2" 15 Av. Cas. 17,238 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
o Id.; Viking Travel, supra note 201, at 17,227.
204 Viking Travel, supra note 201, at 17,235.
2% [1978] 1 TRADE CAS. $ 61,879 (8th Cir. 1978) [hereinafter cited as
Diversified Industries].
2 Id. at 73,690. The report had been prepared after a request from the
board of directors of Diversified, a scrap copper company, and dealt with
Diversified's possible establishment of a "slush" fund to bribe purchasing agents
of companies with whom Diversified had dealt. During the proxy litigation in-
volving Diversified before the instant complaint had been filed, facts surfaced
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two tests for determining whether an attorney-client privilege ex-
isted as to the investigative report-the control group test! 7 and
the subject matter test."' After identifying the weaknesses of the
two tests, the court promulgated a "modified" subject matter test
whereby the attorney-client privilege would be deemed applicable
to an employer's communication if:
(1) the communication was made for the purpose of securing
legal advice; (2) the employee making the communication did so
at the direction of his corporate superior; (3) the superior made
the request so that the corporation could secure legal advice; (4)
the subject matter of the communication is within the scope of the
employee's corporate duties; and (5) the communication is not
disseminated beyond those persons who, because of the corporate
structure, need to know its contents. We note, moreover, that the
corporation has the burden of showing that the communication in
issue meets all of the above requirements.-'
indicating that Diversified may have established and maintained such a fund.
Id. at 73,682-83.
207 The control group test was formulated in City of Philadelphia v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.), mandamus and prohibition
denied, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963).
In this test, an employee's statement is not considered a corporate communi-
cation unless the employee "is in a position to control or even to take a sub-
stantial part in a decision about any action which the corporation may take
upon the advice of the attorney, or if he is an authorized member of a body
or group which has the authority." 210 F. Supp. at 485. It is the most widely used
test. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & D.D. Co., 68 F.R.D. 397,
400 (E.D. Va. 1975).
Although it predominates, the control group test has come under increasing
criticism. See, e.g., Kobak, The Uneven Application of the Attorney-Client
Privilege to Corporations in the Federal Court, 6 GA. L. REv. 339 (1972);
Weinschel, Corporate Employee Interviews and the Attorney-Client Privilege
for Corporate Clients, 12 IND. & COM. L. REv. 873 (1971); Note, 39 FORDHAM
L. REv. 281 (1970); Note, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 759 (1971); but see, e.g., Note,
84 HARV. L. REV. 424 (1970).
" oR The subject matter test was first announced in Harper & Row Publishers,
Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), afl'd, 400 U.S. 348 (1971)
(equally divided court).
In this test, an employee of a corporation, though not a member of its con-
trol group, is sufficiently identified with the corporation "where the employee
makes the communication at the direction of his superiors in the corporation
and where the subject matter upon which the attorney's advice is sought by
the corporation and dealt with in the communication is the performance by the
employee of the duties of his employment." 423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir.
1970).
209 Diversified Industries, supra note 205, at 73,685.
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